Overview of trends during this period
Never an easy task,
it is becoming increasingly difficult – if not well nigh impossible –
to quantify ‘political’ violence, due to the apparently changing
nature of the tactics used to foster conflict. Although dressed up as
‘black on black’ violence in the 1980s, the protagonists could
be clearly identified: Persons associated with political parties and those
who represented that apartheid State. In the run-up to the 1994 election,
the pattern was largely unchanged, except that state-linked aggressors
were, in many instances, becoming less easily identifiable as such (as,
for example, with the attacks on trains). During the past five years that
trend has become more pronounced, with the perpetrators of many of the
killings, and their motives, becoming far less obvious. Such acts – which
include execution-style killings, and what amounts to wanton terrorism,
especially in rural areas – serve political ends, in that democratisation
and development are retarded. Violent crime, too, much of it seemingly
well organised and linked to members of the security forces, also appears
part of a broad destabilisation strategy. In other words, forces opposing
South Africa’s transition to a non-racial democracy, and wishing
to weaken the country’s government, appear to be still at work (which
is not to say that each and every incident of violence is linked to some
sinister strategy)
During the
three months under review these trends have continued, as has taxi-related
feuding and incidents clearly linked to supporters of specific political
parties. For what statistics are worth (not a great deal), at least 165
people have died(40 in December, 60 in January and 65 in February). Again
it must be stressed that this figure is a rough minimum estimate, based
on information which is available at the time of compilation. It does
not include many killings in areas such as KwaDukuza and large parts of
Pietermaritzburg, where well-organised criminal gangsters conduct their
reigns of terror with seeming impunity: Criminality on this scale is simply
not possible without collusion on the part of some members of the police.
Nor are known deaths in rural areas marked by endemic conflict, which
are included, such as those around Greytown, reflective of the total number
of people who are dying. A brief breakdown of regional trends follows.
Regional trends
In the NORTH COAST/NORTHERN
KZN region, killings, and incidents of arson, continue in a number of
places around NONGOMA, where the lack of freedom of political activity
was demonstrated when, on 19 February, persons clad in IFP T-shirts disrupted
a development-linked function which was attended by King Zwelithini and
ANC Public Works Minister Jeff Radebe in eMona. In BABANANGO several murders,
and wanton attacks on cattle, appear linked to power struggles in the
area, including around the issue of traditional leadership (the local
inkosi passed away recently). Two brothers of ANC MPP Mike Mabuyakhulu
were murdered in the INGWAVUMA area towards the end of February, and a
number of ANC supporters have been threatened and/or attacked in and around
PONGOLA.
On 18 February Inkosi
Bhekuyise Ngwane was gunned down at MNGOBOKAZI (Hluhluwe). Ngwane, a CONTRALESA
member, had been involved in a dispute over chiefship with one of his
brothers who, he alleged before he died, had threatened to kill him. He
and his family had also been threatened by local security force members;
in July 1998 his wife had been assaulted, and had a knife held to her
throat, allegedly by members of the security forces. On at least two occasions
appeals were made to the police to try to ensure Mr Ngwane’s safety
(to no avail, it transpired).
Sporadic incidents
of political and/or taxi violence were recorded in a number of other places,
including around KWAMBONAMBI, EMPANGENI, MTUNZINI and MANDENI. In KWADUKUZA
(formerly Stanger) attacks on SHAKAVILLE township, allegedly by persons
from nearby Lindelani, left one person injured and, in a separate incident,
three people shot dead (during February).
In the DURBAN FUNCTIONAL
REGION, there were sporadic killings in hostels to the north and south
of the city itself but, relative to the preceding months, the situation
had improved. Intra-ANC struggles left several people dead in INANDA,
and taxi-related conflict continued to spill over into the centre of the
city (especially the crime-ridden Warwick Avenue triangle)
Sporadic incidents
were recorded in the SOUTH COAST areas around UMZINTO and HIBBERDENE,
but most of the known attacks in this region took place in areas around
PORT SHEPSTONE/MARGATE, IZINGOLWENI and HARDING. There were two massacres
just before Christmas 1998: The first in KWAMACI (Harding), where conflict
had been endemic for several months, left six men dead; in NOSITA, (an
area which had been fairly peaceful for some time) eight family members
were gunned down as they gathered for Christmas. Several incidents of
arson and death were reported from other Lower South Coast areas, including
the killing of five people, in separate incidents on 13 February, in MEHLOMNYAMA.
After some months
of peace, RICHMOND sprang into the national and international headlines
once again with the murder of UDM leader S’fiso Nkabinde on 23 February.
The assassination of Mr Nkabinde was followed, the same evening, by yet
another massacre in which eleven people died (see ‘The Richmond
investigations’ under Comment, below).
Politically-linked
killings and/or tensions continue in a number of other MIDLANDS/INLAND
areas, including ESTCOURT/LOSKOP and BERGVILLE (where a struggle over
chiefship, with clear political overtones, continues). Large parts of
PIETERMARITZBURG,such as Imbali and Dambuza, are ravaged by apparently
well orchestrated criminal violence; some appears to be targetting political
activists. There were a number of taxi-related killings in LADYSMITH.
Of utmost concern is the low intensity war (which incorporates taxi-related
violence) which continues, seemingly unchecked (despite the presence of
a police unit) in a number of areas to the south, north and east of GREYTOWN,
including Mapumulo, Dalton, eTembisweni (where an IFP-aligned induna was
amongst those killed in January) and eMatimatolo Large groups of well-armed
men roam around, and may even attack security forces. Is it simply a co-incidence
that training in the use of arms is reported to have been taking place
in this region for the better part of this decade? It is significant,
too, that most of the attacks on farmers during the three month period
under review occurred in this region – in areas such as Weenen, Kranskop,
Pomeroy and Muden. Whilst there has, quite correctly, been a great deal
of attention given to dealing with crises in Richmond, the continuing
destabilisation of ‘deep’ rural inland areas to the north
and south of the Tugela river is not receiving anything like the attention
it should from the national government. Whilst most victims are the poor
and powerless, no one – including white farmers and holiday-makers – is
safe. The apparent neglect of safety and security in rural areas has potentially
dire consequences for this province.
Countdown
to the 1999 elections :Can they be ‘free and fair’?
What is at issue
here is not whether or not people have bar-coded IDs – for, after all,
those complaining on this front have had ample time to procure these documents.
Crucial to assessing freedom and fairness is the extent to which large
numbers of potential voters are allowed to receive information about different
political parties Even more importantly, they need to know that by casting
their votes they will not be jeopardising their pensions, their houses,
or even their lives.
Sadly, political intolerance
– evidenced by attacks on, or threats to, persons of a different political
persuasion, or the tearing down of party political posters – is still
rife in many areas. Posters advertising voter registration may also be
removed, and persons conducting voter registration may be harassed. Amongst
the areas for which reports of such intolerance have been received during
the past three months are Pongola, Nongoma, KwaMbonambi, Ozwateni, Umtwalume
and KwaMavundla(Harding).
A major thrust of
the post-1994 violence has been directed towards the control of rural
areas falling under traditional leaders/amakhosi/chiefs. In the pre-colonial
era political functionaries known in Africa as ‘chiefs’ owed
their position to a sufficient degree of support from their subjects,
who had various means of removing them should they not fulfill their mandate.
Colonial governments and, in South Africa the apartheid regime, removed
the vestiges of democracy and incorporated traditional leaders into the
bureaucracy of government : They became civil servants, whose jobs (and
salaries) depended – not on their constituencies – but on the largesse
of those who paid them.
When the colonial/apartheid
legislation was being dismantled in the early 1990s, the KwaZulu homeland
re-enacted key elements of the 1927 Administration Act in its Amakhosi
and Iziphakanyiswa Act. Traditional leaders were placed firmly under the
control of the provincial authorities (not their subjects) and the right
to appoint/suspend/remove them was legally vested with the Chief Minister
of the homeland. Post 1994 this function has been taken over by a provincial
Minister of Traditional Affairs. The inherent tension between popular
support and (provincial) government control (which may be diametrically
opposed) remains, and has become exacerbated in a climate in which control
over scarce resources, and over development, is a prime means of winning
political support (including by coercion) and winning votes.
In a number of areas
the utterances and actions (and track records in fanning the flames of
violence) of traditional leaders have stifled freedom of political association.
The lives of some Amakhosi who allow such freedom – the South Coast areas
of KwaXolo and Dududu are but two of several examples – remain in great
danger. Also at risk are the lives of leaders who assert their claims
in the face of attempts by politicians (acting in accordance with legislation
which has its origins in colonial oppression) to decide on who should
be leader on the apparent basis of political expediency. The late Bhekuyise
Ngwane asserted that his claim to chiefly office had been validated by
the Supreme Court – but that the KwaZulu government refused to recognise
him. Similarly, Chief T A Hlongwane of Bergville – removed from his position
in 1980 for daring to stand up to apartheid – has recently had his position
confirmed by the chiefly family council, but is being ignored by the government;
he and his supporters fear for their lives.
This ‘traditional’
institution thus has little to do with pan-African cultural values that
‘a chief is a chief by his people’ – and everything to do
with colonial/apartheid-imposed controls which continue to serve vested
political interests and objectives. The end result of the increasing politicisation
of chiefship, accompanied in some places by endemic violence, is that
fear and repression – which is inimical to political freedom – is more
pronounced than it was in 1994.
Is a Commission
of Enquiry the solution to the problem of violence?
Representatives of
different political parties have been calling for a Commission of Enquiry
into the violence in this province for some time. Recently the IFP has
attempted – unsuccessfully, following Supreme Court intervention – to
establish a Commission to investigate allegations by one of its representatives
against an ANC provincial minister. At the same time, the national government
has indicated that it is giving serious consideration to setting up a
Commission to look into the causes of violence in the province.
It should be pointed
out that both the Goldstone Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation
uncovered a great deal of information which has a direct bearing on the
root causes of the violence, and some of the material has a direct bearing
on what is still happening. Much of this material has not received the
attention it should have – particularly with regard to the deployment
of security force personnel, especially police, in this province. There
are also a number of important prosecutions which should have taken place
by now – including those being handled by Gauteng-based investigators.
Cases have reportedly been withdrawn, and a couple of sacrificial lambs
in the persons of Eugene de Kock and Ferdie Barnard have served to deflect
public attention from other serious matters which have a direct bearing
on what continues to happen in this province.
In other words, we
have had large, expensive Commissions, which have uncovered a great deal
of information which, for a number of reasons (including coverups) has
not been fully utilised. What lessons are to be learnt from these exercises
– and what could a new Commission hope to achieve?
Obviously, any Commission
will stand or fall on the integrity and expertise of the person or persons
who head it. Political nonpartisanship (including any connections with
apartheid justice structures) is also a prerequisite for the position/s.
What should be avoided is the ‘reinvention of the wheel’ option,
in which some large, costly body would take months to accumulate evidence
and issue a report. The aim should be a fairly small, cost-effective structure
which would have wide powers to follow up, immediately, on information
which has a bearing on the violence – whether it is reports of paramilitary
training, the movement of weapons, or coverups in investigations. In other
words, it should be a reputable ‘lean and mean’ judicial body,
with at least one Judge or senior advocate who would have the power to
access police documentation. Great care would need to be taken with staffing,
because experience of various similar bodies suggests that it is at this
level that harmful leakage and sophisticated coverups occur. The example
of gun controls is one of the areas such a Commission could oversee.
Gun control
: The number one priority
Whilst news of proposed
amendments to gun control legislation is welcome, it may well be a case
of ‘too little, too late’ – for the problem is that even existing
legislation is not being properly implemented. For example, people (especially
those linked to endemic violence in the communities concerned, walk around
openly armed (sometimes with more than one gun, one of more of which may
be automatic/semi-automatic) yet no action is taken by the security forces
(who may claim that these weapons are ‘legal’) that weapons
can be acquired quite easily from nearby territories such as Mozambique
is fairly common knowledge – and border controls appear to be very lax
successful prosecutions do not necessarily follow when guns are removed
by army and police – and these weapons may re-circulate guns ‘disappear’
from supposedly safe storage in police stations Vlakplaas weapons of war
– including mines and rocket launchers – are presumably still in this
province Judging from the number of cases in which police and army members
shoot each other and members of the public, many appear unfit to carry
weapons (and off duty members are themselves killed, seemingly for their
guns The private security industry has mushroomed, and has access to large
quantities of weapons. At the same time the credentials of many of these
companies appear extremely suspect, and regulation of their activities
is minimal. The magnitude of this problem is such that it simply cannot
be left to the police alone to deal with – especially as they have shown
themselves unwilling or unable to do so.
Incidents of crimes
such as hijackings would decline rapidly if anything like a proper effort
were made to deal with weapon proliferation.
If a Judicial commission
can do something about cover-ups at the level of policing, and about implementing
controls over guns and security companies it will have served a useful
purpose.
The Richmond
investigations
A recent NIM/HRC
report, which synthesises relevant information from the TRC investigations,
is a useful compilation on the role of the security forces in Richmond.
However, the recommendations it makes are not necessarily realistic, particularly
insofar as the establishment of a judicial body to hear evidence of alleged
police complicity in Richmond violence is concerned. The model of the
Shobashobane Inquiry – which is hearing evidence about policing issues
related to the massacre – is used as an exemplar. Whilst the Shobashobane
inquiry is indeed yielding valuable insights about what happened at that
time, it is not practical, given the extremely limited resources – in
terms of competent personpower and finance – for policing and justice
-to set up a similar commission for Richmond. For one thing, the problems
of Richmond are by no means unique – similar issues are in need of investigation
all over the province. Furthermore, the lesson learnt from the Shobashobane
Inquiry is that it is extremely costly: Police members have a number of
top legal teams at their disposal, at taxpayers’ expense – but money
has to be raised independently(and increasingly difficult task) to cover
even a small legal team for the victims. Without lawyers acting for the
victims little progress is likely to be made in a commission of this nature.
Similarly, in principle, there is nothing wrong with recommending that
investigations be ‘intelligence driven’; the reality is, however,
that the composition of some of the intelligence units operating in this
province – in terms of the backgrounds of certain members – is itself
hugely problematic.
The NIM/HRC report
also recommends that all dockets be channelled through the recently appointed
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions – which appears to be happening.
Again, this may seem a reasonable proposal but in practice it appears
to have led to potentially serious problems in terms of the impact on
the morale of black police members. It should be noted that police members
who were investigating in the Richmond area before the arrival of Mr McAdam
had made a number of breakthroughs in investigations – and that the latter
months of 1998 had been relatively peaceful ones.
There are extremely
sensitive issues here in terms of the racial composition of investigating
units – for, unfortunately, due to the lack of meaningful transformation,
perceptions based on race still hold sway within the SAPS. One of the
carry-overs from apartheid has been the racial nature of command structures
in specialised units, including detectives : Whites (and sometimes Indians)are
in command, and Africans – who do the bulk of the work in African areas
– are in subservient positions. The VIU headed by Captain Mandla Vilakazi
was, until the latter part of 1998, the exception – an exception which
certain members of police management strove hard to remove. During the
latter part of 1998 African members were appointed to head other VIUs,
including in Richmond. The changes which have been initiated since Mr
McAdam took control of the Richmond investigations have – no doubt unintentionally
– been extremely hurtful for African members. There is a perception that
the long-standing pattern (including in Richmond) of removing dockets
from credible African detectives is continuing, and that, in typical baaskap
fashion, Africans are only required to play a junior, subservient role,
whilst others take credit for their work.
There is yet another
disturbing development in investigative work, which relates to the use
of lie-detectors (polygraphs). From press reports it seems that witnesses
who had come forward were considered unreliable because they had failed
lie-detector tests. Subjecting witnesses to such tests raises a number
of extremely serious questions, as to whether they – and the community
from which they came – were fully informed about the nature of such testing,
and their permission was obtained (surely a basic ethical consideration
when witnesses come forward voluntarily).
The time is overdue
for the mythology of polygraphs to be exposed. These tests rest on the
fundamental premise that physiological processes (such as blood pressure
and heart beat), which are closely linked to emotional states, may fluctuate
in situations of stress – the assumption being that telling lies will
cause people stress. The truth of the matter is that the very process
of being connected to such machinery may be extremely stressful – especially
for relatively unsophisticated people – and that the stress they are experiencing
may be erroneously interpreted as due to their lying. Conversely, emotionally
shallow people such as psychopaths may sail through such tests! It is
generally acknowledged that if polygraphs are to be administered they
must be accompanied by extremely skillful questioning – and that even
then the results are not conclusive, but merely point in a certain direction.
Unless certain ethical and professional guidelines are followed, such
tests are nothing better than trial-by-ordeal used to obtain confessions
from supposed witches!
FINALLY, SOUTH
AFRICANS MUST TAKE EVERY CARE THAT THEY DO NOT LOSE THEIR HARD-WON GAINS
IN CONSTITUTIONALLY-ENTRENCHED HUMAN RIGHTS. MOVES BY THE POLICE TO RESTRICT
INFORMATION ARE REGRESSIVE AND UNACCEPTABLE – AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES
SHOULD THE SECURITY FORCES BE GIVEN ANY MORE POWERS THROUGH THE PASSING
OF ADDITIONAL ‘ANTI-TERRORIST’ LEGISLATION.
The Violence Monitor 