Category: Reports

When Advocate Vusi Pikoli assumed office as the National Director of Public Prosecutions in 2005 he was handed a poisoned chalice in the form of Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), popularly known as the Scorpions. From excerpts from his recent book My Second Initiation published in the media he does not seem to have understood the nature of the beast he was burdened with. Nor does he seem to have done the necessary follow up after being warned about security breaches – not only by the then national SAPS commissioner, Selebi (then under investigation by the DSO) but also by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). As a consequence he shows no insight into the lack of co-operation he received from Selebi when the Directorate required documents from the police. Nor did he take heed of the cautions urged by the minister to whom he was responsible and the executive arm of government in expediting the Selebi prosecution without considering possible implications of his arrest for national security. While expressing admiration for the Scorpions, Pikoli’s reported reference to Selebi as an ‘evil’ man is a gross exaggeration. Selebi is a tragic figure , whose arrogance, foolishness and venality – including his failure to discern a serious conflict of interest in his dealings with convicted drug trafficker Glen Agliotti = led to his downfall. However, despite Pikoli’s stated intentions, the organized crime godfathers who had snared Selebi escaped scot free.

PUTTING THE ‘BAD GUYS’ INVESTIGATIONS IN CONTEXT
It was apparently during a project by DSO termed ‘Bad Guys’ which investigated, among other things, the killing of mining magnate and ANC benefactor Brett Kebble in 2005 , that the national commissioner refused to hand over certain documentation to the investigators. Previous reports by KZN Monitor have detailed the serious problems with the DSO – including the inclusion of former apartheid security police members and old guard prosecutors in the unit, its use of highly suspect private security companies for sensitive operations, and its alleged links with foreign intelligence agencies. Examples of its modus operandi, especially its selective leaks to the media during investigations, are given in these previous reports. Its ‘trial by media’ continued with the Selebi case, prior to his arraignment in court after his arrest in September 2007. Those in the unit who had been apartheid operatives would, of course, have been highly skilled in the art of disinformation and propaganda.

Selebi’s loathing of the Scorpions, and the fact that he had made no secret of his determination to re-incorporate investigators into the police, dates back to their malicious prosecution of two outstanding black members of the SAPS just after Selebi took office in 1999 – Director Eric Nkabinde and Captain Sipho Mbele. Nkabinde was then the most senior detective in the province, and Mbele, as head of the team investigating the violence in Richmond, had made stunning progress which, had he been allowed to proceed, would probably have exposed those behind the violence there. These investigations were taken over by the precursor of the Scorpions (IDOC), and Mbele’s work was sabotaged. There are a number of unanswered questions about this turn of events – the removal of a highly successful team(whose work had been praised in the national parliament) and the handing of the dockets to IDOC, whose mandate was not supposed to include political violence. What does seem clear, however, is that it was not opposed by ANC leadership in the province which may have even encouraged it (since appeals to ANC leadership at that time fell upon deaf ears). In fact, one member of the provincial executive had made it clear, before the prosecution, that Nkabinde should take a post in another province.

\The targeting of these two police members was iniquitous, and enraged Selebi. At the time of his arrest Nkabinde was poised to become head of detectives in the province – but his arrest put an end to that. Policing in the province is likely to have been very different – and vastly improved – had he been appointed to that post. The position went to an Old Guard policeman whose conduct, post 1994, did not demonstrate support transformation of the apartheid force. Nor was he as competent as Nkabinde. As a consequence, detective services continued to deteriorate.
Both Nkabinde and Mbele had distinguished careers. It was a team led by Nkabinde (then branch commander at KwaDabeka station) which built a successful case against Samuel Jamile, a member of the KwaZulu Bantustan executive, who was subsequently found guilty of murdering leading United Democratic Front (UDF – desribed as the internal wing of the ANC) supporters in Clermont, near Pinetown, who were opposing the incorporation of the township into KwaZulu.
However, Nkabinde’s detectives were threatened with death so the docket was handed to credible investigators from outside of the area – (then) Captain Frank Dutton (later to head Goldstone and Investigative Task Unit Team investigations) and his partner Warrant Officer Wilson Maghadla. It was they who took the case to court and secured a conviction.

Mbele, then the most senior black detective at Amazimtoti police station near Durban had been the initial investigating officer in the notorious KwaMakhuta massacre case in 1987, when family members of a prominent UDF (United Democratic Front) supporter in the township, Victor Ntuli, were massacred by Inkatha supporters trained by the South African army in the Caprivi. When Mbele made arrests the docket was taken away from him and given to the security police. He himself was harassed and threatened with death for this and other politically-sensitive matters he investigated without fear or favour.

Although totally exonerated of the malicious charges brought by the Scorpions, the outstanding contributions of these two police members were lost to the province : Nkabinde was promoted to the post of provincial Commissioner, Mpumalanga province, and Mbele, totally disillusioned with the lack of transformation in the police, took early retirement.

In the intervening years, between the acquittal of Nkabinde and Mbele in 2000 and the exchanges between Pikoli and Selebi in 2007 – no action whatsoever had been taken against the Scorpions prosecutor behind this malicious prosecution, Chris MacAdam – despite his having, subsequent to the Nkabinde and Mbele matter, contradicted himself under oath in another malicious prosecution, that of magistrate Ashin Singh, There is no indication that he has ever faced any disciplinary action and, according to recent unconfirmed reports, he now heads an ominously named component of the NPA dealing with crimes against the state, despite his obviously not being a fit and proper person to occupy such a position. The failure to act against someone who is clearly unsuited for a prosecutorial role blights the credibility of the DSO – and the NPA. .

SELEBI : PRIDE BEFORE THE FALL

While there were justifiable concerns that the prosecution of Selebi might also have been malicious his trial, and the judgment against him, showed that the DSO case was indeed strong enough to convict him. His own poor performance in the witness stand can have done nothing to support his plea of innocence, especially as he was forced to admit that he had lied about a showing a secret document – which he had had de-classified – to Glen Agliotti.

Prior to his appointment as national commissioner Selebi had been admired internationally for his engagement in issues relating to human rights. However, as in other such placements in former apartheid structures (such as the National Intelligence Agency) his appointment to a key – and untransformed – apartheid bureaucracy would not have been welcomed by many persons on whom he had to rely. While apparently winning his confidence some of these members showed, by their own conduct, that they were set in their old ways. For example, when, in 2002, Supt N, a senior black member in KZN was sidelined on racial grounds for appointment to head a Public Order Policing Unit in the province – despite being eminently qualified for the position – he appealed nationally, to Selebi. Selebi was sympathetic but, correctly (in this instance) delegated the matter to a deputy for attention. Not only was the deputy rude and unsympathetic towards Supt N but he also refused – despite various follow up letters – to return to him a dossier of letters of commendation he had earned for his policing skills in violence torn areas. Co-incidentally this deputy had been a former (supposedly reformed) member of the apartheid security police. He was perceived to be very close to Selebi. Selebi would also have been let down by some of his former comrades who were, like him, integrated into the SAPS without having the necessary capacity for their jobs. Generally speaking, those integrated into the SAPS failed to understand the nature of the policing bureaucracy which, by the end of the 1990s, remained untransformed (a summarized version of a 1999 report ‘The More Things Change – Policing in the New South Africa’ will be available on the Monitor website in 2014).

Central to the case against Selebi was his dealings with Glen Agliotti. He should never, as national commissioner, have been dealing with crime intelligence matters himself but should, as in the matter of Supt N, have delegated the investigations relating to Agliotti and his cohorts to the police’s Crime Intelligence component. His admission that Agliotti was a ‘friend, finished and klaar’ was a damning indictment of his lack of the sense of propriety required of a man in his position – a position which demanded that he maintained a social distance from known criminals. Did he not know that one is known by the friends one keeps?
Having antagonized the powerful and devious Scorpions, and anti-transformation sectors within the police, he was asking for trouble – which he got. In his evidence Advocate Lawrence Mrwebi (a former Scorpions head) argued that the Scorpions had gunned for him, as did former NPA member Prince Mokoledi (who also made serious allegations about NPA members admired by Pikoli) Through his own foolishness and weakness he seems to have walked straight into the trap which was set for him (which is not to condone his actions).

THE REAL WINNERS
Promotional blurbs around Pikoli’s book paint him as a hero who has stood up to a conspiracy against him and won. That is an oversimplification : While the Ginwala Commission which was appointed to assess his fitness to hold office following his suspension found that since the government had not substantiated the reasons it had given for his suspension he should be re-instated. Its findings were, however, critical of him in a number of ways, especially relating to national security issues. As a result of lack of awareness of the broader sensitivities of his office, he needed to enhance his understanding of the security environment in which his office functioned. He had, for example, failed to ensure that all DSO investigators had security clearances and that these were regularly renewed

He was found to show a ‘lack of understanding of his responsibilities ‘to operate within a strict security environment and to ensure that the NPA and the DSO operate in a manner that takes into account the community interest and does not compromise national security’ Also noted was the lack of accountability shown by the DSO to him as the NPA head.

While Selebi has paid the price of his own foolishness there is no indication that organized crime networks linked to Agliotti et al have been neutralized. Ironically, while Selebi’s conviction ended his career in both the police and in Interpol, at least one former member of SANAB, the narcotics arm of apartheid policing whose members moved between that and the security police arm – which was itself linked to drug-related organized crime and the apartheid regime’s chemical warfare programme – is now with Interpol.
Pikoli bemoans the fact that Agliotti and his cohorts walked free which, he emphasizes, had not been the intention. However, he places the blame for this turn of events on his successor, Advocate Menzi Simelani, who removed the ‘Bad Guys’ prosecutor from the case.
In 2011 Stanley Poonin and Stefanos Paparus, accused by Agliotti of trafficking in drugs work R250 million, were acquitted amidst allegations that the state had ‘bungled’ the case.

A recent report by the South African Anti-Drug Alliance, arguing for a re-think on drug policy, including legalization and regulation, points out that despite massive expenditure in its ‘war against drugs’ the conviction rate for drug dealing is woefully low. Most of the convictions are for cannabis (dagga) which grows like a weed in KZN and other parts of South Africa. Cannabis, despite being illegal, is grown legally by the pharmaceutical industry which makes a fortune out of its key ingredient, dronabinol, in expensive drugs used for, among other serious illnesses, HIV and cancer. In the mean time, extremely destructive drugs are traded openly in townships and middle class areas of Durban, amidst well substantiated allegations of complicity on the part of the police.
So the Scorpions, under the de jure (if not de facto) control of Pikoli made no more progress in dealing with serious organized crime
than it had under his predecessors.

However, this unit should never have been dismantled (in what was clearly a political move) – when all that was needed for a re-structuring, with all staff having to re-apply for their positions, and being subject to rigid security checks to eradicate former apartheid era operatives. Pikoli seems to have been in no haste to implement the recommendations of the Khampephe Commission – which were ignored following the change of political guard in 2009 when, ironically, Selebi’s goal of re-integrating investigators back into the police was realized.

Notes
1.Regarding the role of Samuel Jamile in the killings in Clermont see TRC Volume 3, pages 227-228
2.Details of the KwaMakhuta massacre, and the trial of General Magnus Malan, in TRC Report Volume 3 pp 220-223.
3.Report of the Enquiry into the Fitness of Advocate V P Pikoli to hold Office (Ginwala Commission report) at http://www.info.gov.za
4.‘At What Cost : The Futility of the War on Drugs in South Africa’ by Quinton van Kerken Anti-Drug Alliance (available on web)

That contested power relationships lie at the heart of the rape pandemic in South Africa is illustrated by exchanges between men overheard in a rural taxi. The gist was that if women thought they had rights men would use rape to put them in their place. Women of all races, classes and ages are victims, and potential victims of rape, with a quarter of the South African male population having admitted to the crime. However, the powerlessness experienced in dealing with it is compounded by the circumstances under which poor women in rural areas live. While the degree to which police respond appropriately to rape is variable in all areas, the logistics of obtaining help in many rural areas – distances from police stations and from medical assistance – delay the course of justice. To make matters worse, perpetrators are found among the ranks of police members themselves. A recent case dealt with by Monitor suggests that some members may conspire with colleagues to defeat the ends of justice.

Rape in rural areas
The obstacles faced by victims living in rural areas are shown in the case of Ms B who, was raped at night in a rural area which falls under Nyoni SAPS, approximately twenty kilometres away. The police were called early the following morning, by which time the victim had, understandably, washed, reducing the likelihood of recovering forensic evidence. After their initial response to the call the police went away, and returned later in the day, with a female member. They then took the victim to the district surgeon at kwaDukuza hospital (about a half hour drive away). Nine months later Ms B has had no feedback from the police, but enquiries reveal that no arrests have been made. There have been a number of rapes in the area this year, and sundry other criminal activities. According to locals, these crimes are perpetrated by strangers who have moved to the area. Those pushing for the establishment of a DNA database in SA argue that it would play an important role in the conviction of rapists. However, in the case of Ms B – and countless other rape victims living in areas even less accessible to police and medical assistance – the delay in accessing a doctor, plus her having washed, minimises the chance of collecting semen samples. Furthermore, so many criminals continue to operate with impunity without being arrested their DNA samples would not be on the data base anyway.

Although there were some delays, the Nyoni police were fairly diligent in their response – in contrast to reports from some other areas. According to media coverage of a visit of the Gender Commission to the Mbazwana (far northern KZN) policing area, families of rape victims have ‘given up’ on pursuing justice through the police, and accept cattle in compensation for rape (which occurs in other areas also). The rape of children and the elderly is said to be widespread. A local activist is quoted as saying that police do not take victims seriously. To make matters worse, husbands may ‘bully and ostracise’ women who report rape – to the extent of women reporting the rape of a child or grandchild may fear losing her husband.

Recent years have also seen a resurgence in KZN (as opposed to the Eastern Cape where it has long continued) of a custom known as ukuthwala which, in the past, involved men abducting young women who had changed their minds about marrying them (as opposed to ukubaleka, in which a young couple had run away together to force their families to negotiate their marriage). Ukuthwala has now become a forced marriage, usually of young/underage women, often with collusion of parents who welcome the monetary compensation. Certain traditional leaders are among those accused of engaging in this illegal activity.

Parents may also push their young daughters into polygynous marriages with older men because of the financial incentives. What amounts to the selling of daughters is not new in impoverished areas. During research in the late 1980s Monitor was told of poverty stricken families in a Midlands area near Pietermaritzburg accepting money in exchange for their underage daughters. Young women are usually powerless to resist their parents because, without jobs and income, they are dependent on them.

It is known that some teachers also take sexual advantage of impoverished female students in their schools, including those who are (in terms of Children’s Act) underage. Even if it is known that teachers are abusing female learners parents may be reluctant to take steps to expose them, in communities in which there is an exaggerated respect for authority figures, and where intimidation is rife.

Rape by police
The report for 2012/13 released by IPID (the police oversight body) showed a country-wide increase in reported rape by police members, with a figure of 24 given for KZN.
This is not a new phenomenon – police members have got away with raping women for years. In the early 1990s, notorious KwaZulu-cum SAP security policeman, the late Sphiwe Mvuyane, kidnapped and raped women (including university students) with impunity. During the apartheid years there were allegations that some white police members raped black women they picked up for influx control transgressions, but such allegations were impossible to verify. Nevertheless the apparent increase in rape by police members during recent years is disturbing.

To make matters worse, such cases may be under-reported. A recent rape of a young woman living in a rural area in southern inland KZN, Ms C, shows that some cases may not even make it into IPID statistics. Under some pretext Ms C was taken in a police van to Pietermaritzburg where she was raped by the police member, who even instructed her to wash herself afterwards. When she returned to her home she reported the rape at the local station and was given a J88 form to be completed following a medical examination. She saw the doctor at the local hospital but the female police member who was supposed to bring the sealed rape kit to the hospital did not arrive, and did not answer her telephone when she was called. The following day Ms C returned to the police station and tried to open a case. The member on duty told her that she would have to go to Pietermaritzburg where the crime was committed – which is nonsense. After hearing about Ms C’s experience later that day Monitor called the station and the constable on duty repeated what he had told Ms C. Upon insisting on speaking to a senior member the cellphone number of the duty officer was provided. He confirmed that a case should be opened, and said he would proceed to the station. However, despite being contacted, the victim did not return to the station. It transpired that the alleged rapist paid a large sum of money to the impoverished mother, on whom the victim is dependent for subsistence.

In terms of legislation all rape cases must be reported by the station to IPID – but if no case is opened nothing further can be done. Suspicions remain that the delaying tactics – the failure to deliver the rape kit, and the refusal to open a case – may well have been deliberate, since it is known that male police members often collude with perpetrators.

Rape : What is to be done?
Alarm bells about rape have been ringing for years but, despite a Ministry for Women, Gender and Human Rights Commissions, annual periods of activism against violence against women and children, and huge funding poured into anti-violence campaigns, the situation is no better and perhaps – with regular reports of rape of babies, as well as the elderly – is even worsening. A solution should include urgent short term interventions, but also a fundamental shift in gender relationships.

Immediate action should include a far closer monitoring of police investigations into rape cases and an improvement in forensic medical services, especially in rural areas. A far more proactive stance in educational issues involving girls and young women is also needed, with strict sanctions imposed against errant educators. The importance of empowering both girls and boys through education – including in comprehensive life skills programmes – cannot be over-emphasised

However, far more fundamental changes in entrenched male attitudes and behaviour towards women is essential – especially in KZN where the legacy of a century of codified not-very-customary law which denigrated the status of women continues to dominate, especially in rural areas. Traditional leadership itself is often (but not always) guilty of suppressing the rights of women. As argued in previous Monitor reports, the importance of strengthening of the family (in its variety of forms) cannot be overemphasised. There is simply no substitute for male role models who treat women and girl children with respect – and finding ways of promoting this ideal should be a priority.

During the past few months there have been two developments relating to taking and storing human DNA which have implications for people’s human rights, including the right to privacy.  In April a private NPO (non-profit organisation) announced an initiative to take and store children’s DNA and other identifying particulars in a database which could be used in the event of children disappearing.  In June it was reported that a reworked version of an earlier bill amending the Criminal Procedure Act to give the police increased powers to take DNA from suspects, and to establish a national DNA database, was being considered by a parliamentary committee. In August the majority of committee members approved the amended version which will now be considered by parliament.

 These developments take place in the context of a broader move, apparently driven by ‘the north’ to encourage African states to collect and store DNA – including by sending it overseas.

 These moves take place against a background of unparalleled global medical and corporate interest in DNA, an important component of humans’ individuality, which has crucial privacy implications for both individuals and families. It is also a commercially valuable entity which can be cloned and patented.  It is estimated, for example, that commercial developments from the Human Genome Mapping Project account for billions of dollars worth of products per annum. People who supply the DNA do not benefit from its commercial use. The patenting of ‘raw material’ in the form of indigenous knowledge and human tissue is referred to as biopiracy or biocolonialism, and ‘the north’ is accused of ‘bioprospecting’ for it in ‘the south’.  As  David Galton puts it (in Eugenics : The future of human life in the 21^st century’ page138)’The slick virtuoso tricks of the globalised industries are appropriating the genetic raw material of indigenous peoples to create considerable wealth for their shareholders’  Like other personal information, DNA is also  of great interest to powerful insurance corporations.

 Taking and storing human tissue, especially by researchers in the fields of HIV and TB, has become commonplace in South Africa. This tissue is often sent overseas – much of it illegally – where its donor owners  have no control over what happens to it, and whether it will be used to develop new and lucrative drugs (which they and/or their governments would have to pay for).

 What safeguards do those entrusting their/their children’s DNA to others have that it will be safe, including from those wishing to use it to enrich themselves? The answer is, with any proposed storage, very little.

 A proposed database for children’s DNA

According to a press eport in April a privately funded NPO called Identi Masses announced that it would be running a pilot programme in the Western Cape to take biometric and DNA samples from children (at a cost to parents), to be stored in a secure vault in Paarl, which could be accessed in the event of a child going missing (i.e. for identification purposes) As well as DNA (taken with a buccal swab), the stored data would include facial photographs, and details of eye colour, the name of the family doctor, and biometric finger prints.  It was not known when the programme would be rolled out in KZN. Educators quoted in the report pointed out that parents would need to be involved, and raised important questions about the legality of what was being proposed.

 Although the spokesperson for the NPO emphasised that storage would be extremely secure, and security checks would be done on personnel, the proposed project is a dangerous one. Paedophiles have shown themselves extremely innovative at infiltrating  bodies (schools, scouting) centred on children, and security checks are only as good as those doing them. If that were to happen even the safety of the children whose details were stored could be jeopardised.

 Such a project is completely unnecessary : If parents want to take precautions in the event of their children disappearing they should be encouraged to store the DNA of their children themselves, including through the retention of their milk teeth. Limited DNA identification is also available from locks of hair.  Furthermore, some parents have already accessed kits to take and store DNA themselves, which is the best possible safeguard for them and their children – including insofar as privacy issues are concerned..

 The DNA Bil

 In 2009 a section of a new Criminal Procedure Amendment Act dealing with the taking of DNA from suspects by the police, and its storage in a national DNA database, was sent back for amendment by the parliamentary portfolio committee considering it.

 The re-introduction of this contentious piece of legislation, which was being debated in May, received so little publicity – even on the parliamentary website – that the cut off date for submissions about it had already passed once media reports (mainly citing its enthusiastic backers) announced its return to parliament. Even forensic experts from the Durban-based Medical Rights Advocacy Network (MERAN), who had made a submission on the 2009 draft, were not informed, or called upon to give expert opinion.

 The bill follows from, among other things, a study of the DNA database systems in Canada and the United Kingdom, and is a big improvement on the original version.  However, serious concerns remain, including about the constitutional rights of individuals and families to privacy, the potential abuse of specimens for personal gain, the lack capacity and corruption on the part of the police, and the sheer costs of establishing and maintaining such a database in a country which has so many unmet developmental needs.

 The bill allows for samples to be taken from suspects for certain types of crime, storing them for three months before destroying them, and retaining only the profiles (so privacy concerns remain).

 The bill assumes that police act in a lawful manner and arrest suspects for good reason.  That is not the case.. KZN Monitor has a vast amount of research material, especially in the form of cases followed up, showing the extent to which people –  especially the rural poor and powerless – – are abused by the police, both physically, and by malicious arrest. Members often arrest people for no good legal reason, only for cases to be dropped or, if they proceed to prosecution, for no conviction to result There have also been cases suggesting collusion between police and prosecutors (e.g. in collusion with a corrupt local traditional leader).

 The Monitor data also shows how, in one community after another, people claim that criminals – even those responsible for serious crimes such as rape and murder – are known, but are not arrested by the police who are, in some instances, accused of colluding with them..

 The police may not even use the powers they already have regarding the use of fingerprints and DNA. When they do, there are multiple problems with the use and abuse of forensic evidence by both the police and the forensic mortuary services run by the Department of Health (especially in KZN).

 Corruption in the SAPS is widespread and the running of its forensic laboratories is no exception.  In September 2012 the police and prisons trade union POPCRU, released  a dossier claiming, among other things, massive corruption at the forensic laboratory, including the sale of parts of its DNA database machine as scrap metal, the theft of narcotics evidence, and the sabotage of evidence for court cases.  Unsurprisingly, it was announced in March 2013 that the DNA machine was not working

 This then is the context in which vastly increased quantities of DNA would be handled if the bill is passed.  In June 2013 the head of the forensic laboratory was reported to be suing junior officers for alleging he was responsible for corruption at the facility.

 Although the legislation allows for an oversight body, it would be responsible to the Minister for Policing. Judging from experience the proposed oversight body will not be effective.  For example, the civilian oversight policing body, has failed conspicuously to deal with police abuses, as has the Ministry of Safety and Security generally (including through the independent police investigative directorate – iPID – which it controls).

 To make matters worse, conditions at government mortuaries in KZN may jeopardise the safe handling and retention of forensic specimens.  Staff lack qualifications for their jobs (so the laws governing the employment of mortuary technicians are being flouted by their employers, the Department of Health). These employees have shown themselves completely uncaring about the treatment of corpses and specimens by switching off fridges during strikes, and failing to maintain proper hygiene standards generally.  There is no indication of any improvement whatsoever since the 2011 KZN Monitor report on the mortuaries.

 Is this database really needed?

Those promoting the bill are doubtless well intentioned and believe that DNA holds the key to solving serious crimes. However, they seem to be out of touch of the realities of crime for the majority of its victims, and just how serious policing problems are – including insofar as they impact on who gets arrested and the collection and preservation of forensic evidence. They also tend to overlook the fact that this evidence is not necessarily retrievable at crime scenes and is easily contaminated.  While not without its own problems the British system, relative to South Africa, functions well, yet DNA evidence reportedly contributes only0,36% to the detection of all recorded crimes. In the UK, DNA evidence in itself is not sufficient to convict, so a great deal depends on good detective work which is in extremely short supply in South Africa.

 While enthusing about convictions, what the bill’s promoters also overlook is the fact that the poor handling of DNA has also been responsible for innocent people languishing in prison cells.

 The costs of establishing and maintaining such a database are also likely to be prohibitive, if the experience of the UK is anything to go by.  Between 2006 and 2009 it cost that country almost GBP4,3million simply to maintain the system

Whatever its merits,  arguing in favour of a DNA database is premature until there has been a transformation in police detective and forensic work, and a marked improvement in the operations of forensic mortuaries. However, having been approved by the portfolio committee the chances are it will be steamrollered through parliament – although prohibitive costs for scant returns may be taken into account. At the very least, parliament should ensure that registered health professionals are in charge of the handling of this human tissue – and that  a credible, independent body, not responsible to the policing minister, has strict oversight of all aspects relating to the database.

 It is a telling indictment of the slow progress to true democracy in South Africa that, unlike the citizens of Canada or the UK, on whose databases the legislation is modelled, those who are potential victims of abuses of the power it gives the police probably do not know of this legislation, or many other pieces passed by the parliament which supposedly represents them (because of the failure of members of that parliament to keep their constituents informed).

 Whether the bil in its present forml passes constitutional muster in terms of individual and family privacy remains to be seen.

Notes

1.See especially ‘In the wrong hands : A DNA database in South Africa’ by Poonitha Naidoo, at councilforresponsiblegenetics.org as well as the submission on the bill to the portfolio committee by GeneWatch

2/David Galton Eugenics : The future of human life in the 21^st century  London : Abacus 2002

3.Figures on maintenance costs and conviction rates in the UK from Lirieka Meintjes-van der Walt ‘A South African intelligence DNA database : Paracea or Panopticon’ in SA Journal of Human Rights, Volume 27, 2011

4.For one example of how the poor handling of DNA can result in the conviction of an innocent person see Simon LeVay When Science Goes Wrong  London : Penguin 2008 Chapter 9 ‘Forensic Science : The Wrong Man’

5.Main press articles cited : ‘DNA plan for SA kids’ Daily News 12 April 2013

 ‘Lab a crime in itself : Popcru’ The Times, 12 September 2012;  ‘R75m DNA machine is ‘not working’ Daily News 11 March 2013

‘Cop vs cop in slander spat’ City Press 2 June 2013

6/Regarding ethical issues relating to human tissue and biobanking in South Africa see web-based articles by Dr Aslam Sathar

 

Mandela Day 2013 has come and gone, with countless South Africans honouring the great man on 18 July by giving of their time and talents in service to their fellow humans.  By reaching out to all South Africans, including his erstwhile enemies, Mandela prioritised nation-building, so why not continue to honour his legacy every day by placing it firmly back on the national agenda. Almost two decades after he became President our country remains fragmented and preoccupied with the notion of  group ‘differentness’  instilled by apartheid, which Mandela strove so hard to overcome. While lip service is paid to the concept of an African Renaissance, championed by his successor, Thabo Mbeki, the reality is that refugees from elsewhere on the continent are not, for the most part, welcome, and are targets of regular xenophobic-tinged attacks.   Race and ethnicity continue to dominate national discourse. In KZN the ethnic nationalism linked to political violence in the 1980s and 1990s remains a threat, and there is resentment of perceived privilege enjoyed by the sizeable population of Africans of Indian descent by a grouping of black /indigenous Africans.  In recent years the nation-building agenda of Nelson Mandela seems to have slipped from the national agenda.  Let’s revive it and make very day a Madiba Day.

 

South   Africa in the African context :myths and current realities

At an intellectual level support for an African Renaissance remains, marked by an annual festival.  Also popular are references to some supposed pan-African identity – which is often used to justify feudal institutions such as chiefship and fossilised customary law, [1]

 

Of course, despite some wistful thinking on the part of those promoting it, there is no evidence that a common African identity has ever existed.  As Ghanaian author Kwame Appiah notes ‘nothing should be more striking for someone without preconceptions than the extraordinary diversity of Africa’s peoples and its cultures’.[2] Ironically, as many African scholars now realise, contemporary ideas about some mythical African identity rest on colonial assumptions linking ‘darkest Africa’ with skin colour.  As academic V Y Mudimbe argues, the West has been ‘inventing Africa’ for centuries.[3] The extent to which the colonial notion that skin colour defines African identity has been internalised is evident in debates about the meaning of being African in South Africa, and in the use of the derogatory term ‘coconut’ for people who are accused of being too ‘white’. The use of the term ‘African’ remains contested along racial lines, with those complaining of supposed ‘Indian’ privilege saying they are not Africans but ‘Indians in the diaspera’.[4]

 

The reality is that the diversity of Africa has, historically, included that of a racial nature, as people from Europe and Asia have traded and mated with members of the indigenous population for many hundreds or thousands of years. Other forms of diversity include very different economic bases – ranging from foraging (hunter-gatherer) groupings to societies with a long history of urbanisation, and empires. Contrary to the arguments of those promoting traditional leadership, chiefship, is but one of a number of political institutions in Africa, and is certainly not unique to the continent. Nor is ancestral veneration linked to the emphasis on one line of descent a specifically ‘African’ phenomenon, being common elsewhere, including in Asia. In Africa it has continued to thrive, amidst widespread conversion to Islam and, more recently, to Christianity.

 

However, amidst this ‘extraordinary diversity’ there are also common ties which bind South   Africa to the rest of the continent, including historical trade and migratory routes, and the more recent history of shared colonial oppression. Also of great importance is the solidarity of countries all over the continent in supporting the struggles of the liberation movements against apartheid.  The extent of this solidarity is documented in the recently published volume in the Road to Democracy in South Africa series titled African Solidarity.[5]  Many of these countries paid dearly for their support for the liberation movements, including through the military activities of the South African Defence Force in the war against the liberation movements in other African countries, and the economic ravages which accompanied this war – including the SADF’s role in the international illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn and the destruction of wildlife which accompanied it, detailed in the report of the Kumleben Commission of Enquiry in 1996.

 

Despite the lip service to pan-Africanism, there are serious concerns in human rights circles about the treatment meted out by the Department of Home Affairs to those fleeing the threat of harm in other African countries, especially since changes to the law in 2011. Refugees from polarised, conflict ridden countries such as the DRC and Burundi, tell of being treated rudely by officials who do not follow due legal procedures, and living with the ever-present threat of imprisonment and summary deportation. Amnesty International is among those expressing fears that moves by this government department violate South Africa’s international and domestic obligations towards asylum seekers, and deny them their much needed international protection.

 

The hostility faced by many foreigners living in communities all over South Africa also belies political rhetoric about shared African identity and solidarity. This hostility frequently erupts into violence and murder, with perpetrators generally operating with impunity.  One factor mentioned is the apparent economic success of some of the businesses run by foreigners – especially Somalians – who, through their shops, provide a service to community members. Instead of channelling resentment into healthy business competition, the success of hard working foreigners is used as a pretext for attacks, many with clear xenophobic overtones.  The hostility is often overt, as in a statement by The Greater Gauteng Business Forum (an association of small shop owners) : ‘They are here to destroy local business and people, particularly local shop owners, are boiling with anger’[6]

 

The legacy of divide-and-rule in colonial and apartheid South Africa

An apparent resurgence of ‘tribalism’, and, in KZN, what is perceived as ‘anti Indian’ sentiments among certain sectors of black/indigenous African society, must be situated within both historical and current politico-economic context.

 

Apartheid South   Africa was aptly described by historian Leonard Thompson[7] as a ‘pigmentocracy’, with levels of privilege assigned on the basis of skin colour.  One manifestation of this policy was the geographical separation of the races, with cities like Durban having Indian and ‘coloured’ zones providing ‘buffers’ between the white overlords and the black Africans. Education for the different races was perceived to be similarly stratified – the best for whites and the worst for indigenous Africans, with that for ‘coloureds’ and Indians in between. With few exceptions (such as the historic ties between the Natal Indian Congress and the ANC) physical separation of races was accompanied by social separation and isolation – especially after the implementation of the Group Areas Act in formerly mixed areas such as Cato Manor in Durban..

 

Together with these racial divides, it was, above all, the homeland policy which entrenched and reinforced ethnic divisions among the indigenous population (even Soweto was divided into ‘tribal’ zones). The apartheid edifice was built on the colonial policies of geographically defined tribal reserve areas (which became the Bantustans), indirect (top down) rule through politically controlled chiefs, and the standardisation of languages from similar regional, unwritten dialects. The cut off point separating isiZulu from isiXhosa, for example, was the political boundary between what was then the colony of Natal from the Eastern Cape.

 

In what is now KZN (prior to 1994 the province of Natal and the Bantustan of KwaZulu, which were inextricably entwined) all black Africans, regardless of historical origin and culture, were designated Zulu, and decreed citizens of KwaZulu.  Many of these people had never been subjects of the Zulu kingdom, with its heartland north of the uThukela River, tens of thousands (at least) having fled the kingdom and the area south of the uThukela during the military forays of Shaka and Dingane, returning once these raids had ceased.  The far north of the province (Ingwavuma and Tongaland) had never been part of the kingdom; they were annexed by the British government only in the late nineteenth century. Nor had the Bacas, whose membership straddles southern KZN and the Eastern Cape, ever been part of the kingdom. The sizeable Hlubi community in KZN continues to fight for acknowledgement of its distinct identity.  All of these people were decreed Zulus and made citizens of the KwaZulu Bantustan.

 

It was twentieth century events – primarily political – which would shape and consolidate the Zulu identity which exists today. In KwaZulu this identity was reinforced in schools (including through a special ‘Ubuntu-Botho’ syllabus) and (as in other societies) the invention of traditions celebrating Zuluness.  The success of the divide-and-rule strategy was evident by the 1980s, with research showing the dominance of views of personal identity as ‘Zulu’ rather than as ‘black’ (as in being oppressed) or South African.  This identity had also become heavily politicised, with ‘Zulu’ being linked to being a supporter of Inkatha, and Xhosa/Pondo linked to the ANC. These labels featured conspicuously in the State-sponsored political violence which claimed thousands of lives in the latter 1980s and 1990s (documented in detail in early (then) Natal Monitor reports.

 

As a legacy of the recent past, these narrow ethnic identities continued to feature in post-1994 political discourse, seemingly becoming more conspicuous in recent years. Following the removal of Jacob Zuma as Deputy President in 2005, and the corruption charges subsequently brought against him, Zuma’s supporters rode the bandwagon of Zulu ethnicity (e.g sporting ‘100% Zulu boy’ T-shirts when he appeared in court). Speaking in April 2013, at the launch of Volume 6 of the ‘Road to Democracy’ series on the liberation of South Africa, former President Mbeki expressed concern about the pervasiveness of ‘tribalism’, and slogans such as ‘100% Venda’, or ‘100% Tswana’ . During recent political campaigning in Limpopo province, Deputy ANC Chairperson, Cyril Ramaphosa, was asked whether he was ‘Ndebele or Zulu’.[8]

 

In KZN Zulu identity is reinforced by annual cultural festivities which are mixtures of reworked old and newly invented traditions – such as new public rituals linking the female deity Nomkubulwana to virginity testing (formerly the domain of female family members). These include the annual Reed Dance and First Fruits ceremony led by the Zulu monarch, who has also purportedly ‘revived’ the custom of circumcision for young men supposedly done away with by King Shaka (there is no real evidence to substantiate this assertion).  There are also constant references to the ‘Zulu nation’ (despite a nation being a political unit, and South Africa being a republic), and plans are afoot to erect a giant statue of King Shaka, to rival international landmarks such as the Statue of Liberty, on the banks of the uThukela River..  Leading educationist, Professor Jonathan Jansen, correctly points out that the introduction of a mandatory course in Zulu for all students at the University of KZN may encourage Zulu cultural nationalism[9] (and Zulu speaking students on this campus have exhibited ethnic chauvinism towards black African students from elsewhere in the country in the recent past)

 

Since the establishment of the KwaZulu homeland, it had been Inkatha (IFP) which had actively promoted Zulu culture, and used it as a political platform. In the 2009 national elections the party lost ground in KZN to the ANC – a loss apparently linked to the latter party being led by a Zulu president. Crucial cabinet portfolios nationally – police, security, and justice – are occupied by Zulu-speakers, one of whom bears prime responsibility for the notorious Protection of State Information (secrecy) bill.[10]

 

There is nothing wrong with pride in ethnic identity, provided it does not become entangled with competition for economic or political resources (as this province – and the Witwatersrand area – learnt to its cost in the early 1990s). The potential for increased tribalisation of ANC politics will need close watching in the run up to national elections in 2014 – particularly given the tendency of some ANC representatives to cast political or civic opponents in ethnic terms. Since the 2009 elections housing activists in informal settlements, including Abahlali baseMjondolo have been cast as ‘Xhosa’ trouble makers, as have COPE supporters in politically contested areas.  In recent struggles around housing in the Cato Crest shack area in Durban, ANC representatives in leadership positions are accused of being ‘AmaPondo’ (from Eastern Cape – Mandela is Pondo) who are taking houses away from Zulus. It is ironic that twenty years ago the label ‘Pondo’ was used in attacks against the ANC in this province.

 

Anti-Indian rhetoric in KZN

In recent months public statements by a grouping named Mazibuye African Forum (which claims to draw members from different political parties) has generated debate in the media about its perceived anti-Indian sentiments. The Forum claims that the target of its criticism is the economic system.

 

The basis of these public utterances is a document titled ‘Economic Quagmire in KwaZulu-Natal : Socio-Economic Injustices in KwaZulu-Natal.’ While making sweeping statements without substantiation – some of which are historical oversimplifications or inaccuracies – this document does raise serious issues about the implementation of government policy, especially as it relates to Black Economic Empowerment and Employment Equity, which need serious debate.

 

The history of African-Indian relations in KZN as described in this document is a grossly oversimplified and, in places, inaccurate, one. For example, the ‘Durban Riots’ involving Africans and Indians in 1949, in which dozens of Indians and black Africans lost their lives, are said – without any supporting evidence – to have been instigated by Indians.  As the late, highly respected researcher, political activist and Mandela biographer, Professor Fatima Meer points out, these riots took place in a context of virulent anti-Indianism by white politicians (who used Indian-directed vitriol as a vote-catching exercise in the 1948 elections in which the Nationalist Party came to power).  It was also one of growing rapprochement at a political level between the African and Indian Congresses (which would have posed a threat to the white status quo) Following her own research several years after the riots she goes so far as to say these riots were ‘white instigated’ with whites actively engaged in encouraging attacks on Indians.[11]

 

Mazibuye also glosses over the extent of the poverty in which most Indians historically lived. Meer cites research carried out by the Department of Economics at the University of Natal, which estimated that in 1949 more Indians in Durban than Africans lived below the poverty datum line, with the South African Institute of Race Relations giving a figure of 70.7% (which should not be seen as minimising the dire poverty among black Africans too, which was to increase dramatically with the forced relocations of millions of people during the implementation of the homeland policy from the 1960s)

 

Also ignored by Mazibuye, in calling for some Indian land to be redistributed to black Africans, is the fact that some land farmed and/or owned by Indians in, e.g. Nonoti (near kwaDukuza, where it is used for shack farming), or in the Camperdown area (where tribal authorities have irregularly erected housing and a school) has already been illegally taken over since the 1990s.  Many Indians lost land they owned with the implementation of the Group Areas Act in the 1950s – and have not been assisted by the Land Claims Commission in recovering it, or obtaining compensation.  Indians who, together with black Africans, owned land in Inanda, were also forcibly driven out of the Ghandi settlement area in 1986 in what appeared clearly the work of the hidden hand of apartheid, since the government had been trying to move Indians off the land, where they lived amicably with black Africans, as part of its homeland policy. This land became the densely settled shack area of Bhambayi (from ‘Bombay’) [12]

 

Despite the inaccuracies and oversimplifications this document raises important issues about the government’s economic and employment policy which need far wider debate, and further research.

 

Regarding BEE, the fundamental argument is that this policy is working more to the advantage of whites, Indians and ‘honorary blacks’ such as Chinese. Among the aspects dealt with is the ‘fronting’ phenomenon which, it claims, is discouraging entrepreneurship because it is far easier to earn money in that way – or to acquire BEE shares and non-executive director positions – as opposed to starting up new majority black African owned businesses. The problem, it says, is compounded by discrimination against such businesses in the awarding of contracts, and government-owned development financing institutions, such as the KZN Growth Fund (such financing bodies, it claims, are controlled largely by whites and Indians)  Among other claims is that foreign-owned businesses exploit loopholes in BEE in South Africa, but tend to work with Indian owned, rather than African owned, ones’  The example of the Gupta family is used to argue that some foreigners have no real commitment to the development of South Africa, and stash the wealth generated in their countries of origin – so the loyalty to South Africa of such entrepreneurs is doubted.

 

That fronting is widespread is common knowledge – but there seems little political will to deal with it. For example, it is rife in the powerful security industry.  Provisions exist in the PSIRA (Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority) legislation allowing for proper forensic investigation of the finances of security companies, but there seems to have been little inclination to implement it.  The same could be said for most other sectors of the economy.[13]

 

Similarly, employment equity is seen as having benefitted white women and Indians more than black Africans, with disproportionate numbers of Indians, e.g. represented in government departments such as SARS (South African Revenue Services) – and in management positions in eThekwini municipality.  Empirical evidence is needed to support these assertions. However, from KZN Monitor research into policing, there are clear examples in which Indian SAPS members – some with apartheid security police backgrounds – have been unfairly advantaged in promotion relative to experienced and highly competent black African members and/or occupy proportionally more senior positions relative to black African members..  A recent example in the public domain concerns the employment by the Crime Intelligence Component of the SAPS of convicted drug dealer ‘Timmie’ Marimuthu and members of his family. Marimuthu holds the rank of colonel, far above – and out of all proportion – to the ranks held by many long serving black African members.

 

Conversely calls to ‘Africanise’ both the Department of Health, and the Nelson Mandela School of Medicine at the University of KZN – have shown gross discrimination against highly qualified Indian professionals, in favour of those who are not necessarily well qualified for senior positions.  Ironically, such calls take place in the context in which it is known that the support of certain wealthy Indian business people is welcomed with open arms by both the governing party and a number of its representatives.

 

With justification, Mazibuye and its supporters claim that black African children often face discrimination in schools, in that they are disproportionally channelled into ‘Maths literacy’ classes in the years leading up to Matriculation examinations – which means that they are automatically excluded from applying for courses such as Engineering and Medicine when they complete school.  Because of the proximity of what were formally (in terms of the Group Areas Act) African, Indian and Coloured areas, and the perceived better education offered by, e.g. Indian schools, many of the schools in KZN which move children to ‘Maths literacy’ – unless their parents can pay thousands of rand for additional maths tuition – are former (under apartheid) Indian schools.  However, this channelling into maths literacy is said to be happening in schools all over South Africa.

 

Is the creation of ‘Maths literacy’ simply a cover for poor teaching of Maths in so many schools, with a view to boosting the pass rates of Mathematics? It certainly does discriminate against children whose parents cannot afford the extra maths lessons which so many middle-class parents arrange for their children.  Had such a move (or the ‘Zulufication’ of university teaching) been made by the apartheid government there would have been an outcry.

 

As with all criticism targeting ‘groups’, and the stereotypes which accompany it, Mazibuye Forum’s perceived anti-Indian sentiments not only contribute to polarisation along group/racial lines, but also obscure the countless examples of good working relationships between members of these groups, and the dedication of large numbers of Indians, including professionals such as doctors and lawyers, giving of themselves tirelessly in service of all South Africans, including black Africans.

 

The way forward

What steps should be taken to move away from this ‘group’ mentality, address existing tensions, and build the nation envisaged by our Constitution?

 

• Maths literacy should be done away with, and resources poured into proper teaching of mathematics at a primary school level, which is the foundation on which secondary and tertiary level learning is based
• Credible research is needed on the issues of BEE and Employment      Equity raised by Mazibuye. Empirical studies of organisational structure and culture in, e.g. eThekwini municipal governance (or other bureaucracies), looking at loci of power and authority, could be used to substantiate or repudiate allegations that it is Indians who exercise control
• The need for an evaluation, followed by an amendment, of BEE      policy, is overdue – especially given what is already known about its      shortcomings. Mazibuye makes a number of detailed recommendations which  deserve serious consideration
• There is an urgent need for ongoing public dialogue and debate, led      by respected leaders of black African and Indian communities – e.g.      professionals, academics, representatives of faith-based organisations about the issues raised by Mazibuye Forum
• Political leaders should send out strong messages to their public      representatives, and to their constituencies to desist from using ethnic labels against their opponents, whether political or civic organisations
• We need a concerted nation-building campaign to address the ills      referred to in this report
• Government policy regarding refugees, and the way it is implemented by the Department of Home Affairs, must be urgently addressed – as should concerns that foreigners living among us do not enjoy sufficient protection from the police

 

KZN is richly blessed with cultural and religious diversity, and with hard-working, law abiding residents from many African countries (if there are criminals among them the law should deal with them, as it should with our home-grown criminals who operate with impunity).  Pride in ethnic identity is compatible with a broader nationalism (as e.g. Irish Americans), or with being a citizen of Africa and the world. The largely self educated Sol Plaatjie, a founding father of the ANC, travelled widely and was a lover of Shakespeare who used English to court his Xhosa wife. He also wrote a novel, Mhudi, celebrating Setswana custom and the relevance of an indigenous perspective.  Let us use the vision of Plaatjie and his fellow ANC founders to re-build and unify our fragmented country.    As under the Presidency of Nelson Mandela, this campaign should start at the top. Is the present government sufficiently committed to it? 

From recent events in Cato Crest, Durban, it seems that government representatives do not understand the distinction between their roles as elected officials who are supposed to serve all community members and the narrow political interests of their own party.   On the night of 26 June, local housing activist Nkululeko Gwala was shot dead. He had apparently been collecting information about corruption in housing allocation which he had planned to release to the media. His death followed a meeting in Cato Crest addressed by the eThekwini mayor, James Nxumalo, and the ANC’s eThekwini Regional Chairperson, Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo (who is also MEC for Health in KZN). In his speech to those gathered Dhlomo reportedly boasted that the area was a ‘Gedleyihlekisa ‘ [Zuma/ANC] one, and said that Gwala should be removed to his home at Inchanga. Dhlomo has since denied allegations that his speech was tantamount to inciting listeners to harm Gwala, but he has failed to explain why he, as ANC regional chair, attended what was supposed to be a community – as opposed to party political – meeting.  His presence, and his reported speech, at this meeting sends out a strong message that the area is ANC territory and that other parties (including civil society organisations) should not be involved in local issues. It seems that the notion of ‘no go’ areas, which led to so much bloodshed in this province, is still alive and well. The implications for truly free and fair elections in 2014 are ominous.

 

Background to the death of Nkululeko Gwala

In March 2013 there were new bush clearing operations next to Cato Crest, a shack settlement in which formal housing is being built. These operations appear to have been part of a broader move by many city shack dwellers, dissatisfied with the municipality’s allocation of houses, to invade private and municipal land.  On 13 March the house and office of the councillor for Ward 101 (Cato Crest) was stoned by an armed mob after he had pleaded with them to stop the land clearing and building. He and his family left the area.  The land invaders reportedly included people whose shacks had been demolished when formal housing was built, who had not been given new houses, as well as those who had been making money from letting out the demolished shacks.  The municipality obtained an interdict against the invaders. According to the shack dwellers movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo (which was not involved in these invasions), well organised syndicates were taking advantage of the poor, who, despite being promised houses, saw them allocated elsewhere. Some of these people had been living in ‘transit camps’ for years.

 

On the night of Friday 15 March, the president of the Cato Crest Residents Association, Thembinkosi Qumbelo, was shot dead after visiting a local tavern. Qumbelo was an ANC member, and did not belong to Abahlali.  He had been trying to persuade the municipality to allocate houses to shack dwellers whose homes had been demolished. Another committee member of the Residents Association had been shot and injured, at his Cato Crest home, the day before Qumbelo was killed.

 

Shortly after these events eThekwini mayor James Nxumalo addressed a community meeting, and called for the shack dwellers to elect a committee of ten people with whom the municipality could work on housing issues. Nxumalo warned political parties to stay out of issues relating to land invasions.

 

Central to all these events were continuing allegations of nepotism (political and family connections) and bribery in the awarding of houses, raising questions about whether or not housing lists, on which persons applying for houses names appeared in the order of their application, existed.  Following an article in the Sunday Tribune on 28 April, which, citing various sources as saying that such lists did not exist, the municipality ‘clarified’ the situation.  Housing lists had been done away with because they were ‘discriminatory’ and ‘raised expectations’.  The municipality now had database showing ‘how many families live in informal settlements’, Various criteria were laid down for eligibility for what are termed ‘Green field’ projects, which were advertised in Metro publications.  In the case of the upgrading of informal settlements, beneficiaries would be informed by their councillor or Development Committee.  The municipality denied that councillors were involved in the allocation of housing.

 

On 23 May,  persons living in nearby Ward 30 (Dunbar/Bonela area) took to the streets, blocking roads with burning tyres and rocks, demanding the removal of their councillor, Zanele Ndzoyiya, alleging that her election had been rigged (she was one of eleven councillors in KZN investigated by the ANC for irregular nomination). The site of some of the protest, Vusi Mzimela (Bellair) Road runs between Bonela and Cato Crest.  While in the same general vicinity, the reasons for the protests in the two areas differed.

 

Cato Crest residents too continued with protest action, blocking a nearby road on 24 June. Ward 101 councillor Ngiba told protesters he would meet with four representatives, of whom Nkululeko Gwala, who had recently joined Abahlali, was one.  According to a statement issued by Abahlali, they stressed that they wanted to meet with the ward committee, and not with political party representatives. The meeting was arranged for Tuesday morning 25 June. When the four housing activists arrived they found ANC and SACP representatives present. When they protested the ANC representatives reportedly said that. ‘this was ANC land and that the housing project was an ANC project, and that they would make all the decisions in the area about the project’.  Nkululeko Gwala walked out and the other three remained. They were allegedly told that the ANC would not accept Gwala’s disrespect, and threats were made.

 

On that same Tuesday night there was further protest in the Dunbar area, and the offices of  Councillors Ndzoyiya and Ngiba were burnt down.  According to Abahlali they do not have members in that area.

.

It was on the morning of Wednesday 26 June that a municipality car with a loud hailer called people to a meeting supposedly to ‘unite’ the community. It was this meeting that was addressed by Nxumalo and Dhlomo – despite Nxumalo’s earlier insistence (in March) that politicians should not involve themselves in such meetings. Gwala was accused, among other things, of being disrespectful, causing problems for the party (ANC) and bringing a new party into the area (presumably Abahlali, which boasts of having supporters from different parties).

 

From events leading up to Gwala’s death it seems that the ANC views Cato Crest as its exclusive territory – which lends credence to allegations that political patronage is dispensed through housing allocation. The lack of clarity about who qualifies for upgrading, with decisions apparently being taken by faceless municipal officials who liaise with councillors, also feeds perceptions of nepotism.  Housing activists have fled the area, and a climate of fear, fuelled by rampant criminality, prevails in Cato Crest. An Ethopian shopkeeper, Dessia Bejego, was shot dead in broad daylight on 4 July.  With a view to preventing further violence in Cato Crest and other contested shack areas (including Kennedy Road),  and the promotion of multi party campaigning in the run up to the 2014 elections, KZN Monitor calls for

• Nonpartisan protection of shack dwellers by proactive policing, in line with the aims of Sector Policing
• The  publication by the municipality of its data base of shack dwellers, so that residents can check if their correct details have been captured, and the criteria used for taking decisions about who qualifies for upgrading to formal housing
• Political party leaders to take immediate steps to end ‘no go’ areas, and to be held strictly accountable for doing so.

Land claims settled in the Kranskop area in 2005 are touted by the government as one of the success stories of land reform. Nothing could be further from the truth : Firstly, the recipients were set up to fail because they were given land but no resources, including support services, by the Department of Land Affairs. To make matters worse, one of the parties, the Amakhabela traditional community, is making apparently well founded allegations that many of the farms transferred to the other party, the Ngcolosi community  – including a recent transfer of Mondi plantation land –  are on land historically belonging to the Makhabela.  They also claim that the  Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (‘Land Affairs’) in Pietermaritzburg is refusing to engage with them about what they view as a gross injustice. Tensions are rising and there are fears that violence will erupt. If it does, the responsibility must be laid at the feet of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform.

 

In 2003 two claims, one by the Ntunjambili/ Ngcolosi and the other by the Amakhabela traditional community, for dozens of farms( 150 plus ) in the Kranskop area were gazetted. No proper verification process was undertaken by the Regional Land Claims Commission to ascertain the historical validity of these claims. However, it seems that the majority of the landowners were prepared to sell, having been offered good prices. Trusts were established by the two communities, but no resources or support services were forthcoming, so outside management was brought in, at a cost, to run the farming enterprises (mainly sugar and timber).  The Amakhabela aver – with supporting evidence – that many of the farms had historically been on their territory. Their attempts to meet with Land Affairs about their grievances have reportedly been unsuccessful.

 

Several months ago, a large tract of Mondi plantation land which was apparently also historically Makhabela territory, was reportedly handed over to the Ngcolosi.  Signs denoting that this is now iThuba (the Ngcolosi commercial company) are seen as extremely provocative, and there have already been threats that people associated with iThuba will be forcibly removed from the area. Community leaders are trying to defuse the situation but, given the complete lack of transparency on the part of Land Affairs, and its failure to address the concerns of the Amakhabela, it is likely to be only a matter of time before threats lead to overt conflict – which will then probably lead to ongoing feuding between the two parties. Nor has Land Affairs responded to questions posed by KZN Monitor about this hand over.  Given the apparent lack of any proper verification processes it is not surprising that rumours of nepotism and vested interests are flying around.

 

The situation in Kranskop provides yet more evidence that the failure of the government’s land reform policy lies with its own department. Providing land to emerging farmers – who really want to succeed – without providing any resources and extension services is a recipe for disaster. It also fuels negative stereotypes about supposed ‘cultural impediments’ to black people succeeding as farmers. One such assertion was published in a recent edition of the Farmers Weekly.  There is no historical foundation for labelling black farmers in this manner.  Historians have shown how, in the nineteenth century, peasant farmers in areas such as the Eastern Cape and what is now Lesotho were quick to seize the opportunities provided by the growth of the country’s population following the discovery of minerals (Lesotho was then seen as the bread basket of the sub-continent).  The rapid demise of this farming sector was brought on my land dispossession, the lack of infrastructure and access to markets (transport routes, for example, favouring the rapidly expanding white commercial farming) which forced black peasant farmers into a life of migrancy from which they have still not, eighteen years after the end of apartheid, escaped. As under colonialism and apartheid, rural areas still function largely as labour resevoirs for mining and industry. According to a media report, mismanagement at the provincial department responsible for agriculture and rural development has resulted in tractors rusting away instead of finding their way to emerging farmers who need them.

 

Since 2000 there have been ongoing complaints from both claimants and land owners about the conduct of staff at the Land Claims Commission and Department the Land Affairs in their handling of contentious land claim issues.  That their lack of transparency and accountability – which is all too common in government departments – may well be the catalyst for an outbreak of violence in Kranskop is absolutely outrageous. There is an urgent need for intervention from the national level, including by holding the national minister accountable for the abysmal performance of his staff.

Another year of abnormally high levels of violent crime and gratuitous brutality has ended. While much of the blame can be laid at the door of the criminal justice system* there can be no dramatic drop in violence until structural problems affecting family and community life are addressed.  Perpetrators of serious violent crime are found among all races and all classes. However, a disproportionate number of victims and perpetrators are black African, which is a legacy of our past.  As the Marikana tragedy showed, virtually nothing has been done in the past eighteen years to deal with the major cause of family instability for millions of people : The migrant labour system and its attendant ills. Cleansing ceremonies and moral regeneration campaigns are of limited value if children have not learned moral values and non-violent solutions to problems during their formative years.  In all societies it is the family, in its different forms, from which children learn core values. It is iniquitous that millions of South African children are still denied their right to a stable family life.

 

The impact of the past on the present

The discovery of minerals in the nineteenth century led to massive labour migration from rural areas, much of it prompted by land dispossession. Families were left without adult men (and women, if they too migrated). Influx control, the Group Areas Act and the forced relocation of millions of rural residents for purposes of homelands consolidation, wreaked havoc by disrupting stable communities. In rural areas children grew up in dire poverty in communities demographically skewed by the absence of adults, especially men, for most of the year.  For many decades researchers have recorded high percentages of female-headed households.  They are common in poverty-stricken societies in which the role of men, disempowered by discrimination and lack of access to decent employment, is marginal.

 

In urban and mining areas migrants are housed in dehumanising single sex hostels (because families were historically forbidden from entering town).  By the 1980s women were living with men in many hostels.  However, the nature of the accommodation – crowded, shared rooms with Spartan furnishings – did not encourage men to ring their families, but local girlfriends, and children, moved in. Men had little control over who their room mates brought in, and some complained bitterly of the lack of privacy, women fighting among themselves, illegal shebeens, and theft of personal belongings. Millions of people, including countless children growing up in these environs, have been – and still are – brutalised by extremely high levels of violence in these overcrowded dormitories.

 

The damage done to gender relationships by the structural changes should not be underestimated. The interdependence of the sexes of the pre-colonial era, and the authority of the senior male over his sons, was transformed by the independent earning capacity of men and women. At the same time, cruel and humiliating racial discrimination dealt a severe blow to the self-image and autonomy of many men who were also being challenged by the growing independence of women.  Power dynamics are central to violence and for decades researchers noted how many men displaced the frustrations of their own experience of powerlessness on to women, by abusing them and failing to maintain them.

 

Criminalisation of black people for trivial (and unjust) offences also occurred from the late nineteenth century. These offences related to the brewing and sale of liquor (even traditional beer, which the government monopolised), ‘pass law’ infringements and from the 1970s, possession of dagga. Petty offenders, falling victim to prison gangs, often emerged as hardened criminals.   At the same time, extremely dangerous drugs such as apartheid state-linked mandrax netted increasing numbers of drug addicts, whose addiction often led to other criminal activities to feed their habit.

 

The scars of the past have not disappeared in eighteen years and, unless there is fundamental structural change, they are unlikely to do so in the near future. Families remain divided between urban and under-developed, poverty-stricken rural areas, which still serve as labour resevoirs, as they did under colonialism. Migrancy has become a way of life for many men for whom it means the best of both worlds, since they can maintain their rural base and families (whom they may or may not support) while taking up with other women, and fathering children by them, in urban areas.  In towns or on the mines they are still, for the most part, subject to inhumane living conditions which would not be acceptable in ‘first world’ countries – yet they are still deemed good enough for black people in democratic South Africa.

 

So the past continues to shape the lives of a significant sector of the country’s population. Men whose fathers abused their wives, and children who were abused themselves, are likely to continue these patterns of abuse in their own families.  If appropriate male role models are absent the work of mothers and grandmothers is far more demanding and the children lose out. Both male and female children need stable male, as well as female, role models and the fact that too many do not have them is manifest in various ways, including criminal activities and teenage pregnancies.  Children need the love and security of a stable family grouping in which core values which promote the development of conscience are instilled, one in which fathers support their families and do not abuse them.  Poverty in itself does not lead to criminality – but in a society in which there are glaring inequalities, and the only male role models for badly educated, unemployed young men are public figures who promote the worst excesses of conspicuous consumption, a life of crime can easily beckon.

 

Healing the family to heal the wider community

It is time to put policy about family life in the public spotlight, and to address the issues which separate families, especially the lack of rural development and the need for family accommodation for migrants. Despite the government hype about development, changes in rural KZN since 1994 have been minimal.  There is a  multi-million rand development at Nkandla but people living in the same region (Umlalazi near Eshowe) suffer long periods without water, as do those in other rural areas. The Nkandla project includes new road works – yet in remote areas people battle to access clinics because of the state of the roads.  The National Development Plan speaks of increased food production, which would obviously create rural jobs – but that needs infrastructure, including reliable water supplies. At the same time, the mining industry is spreading its tentacles in rural areas, further jeopardising precarious water resources while creating minimal employment. Nor can there be any real development until the whole question of land use and ownership is traditional areas is addressed – and until the damage done to the land reform process by government departments is corrected.

 

It is imperative for all who are concerned about the circumstances in which millions of our children are growing up, including faith-based organisations, NGOs, professional associations and trade unions, to speak out about the evils of migrancy, and demand that in 2013 the government and employers start taking the steps needed to promote stable family life.

One of the policy issues up for debate by the ANC at Mangaung is the slow pace of land reform.  There can be no meaningful solution to this problem unless the government is prepared to shoulder the blame for failing to deliver, and to take urgent remedial action.  Events in Mangete illustrate the complete failure of the Department of Land Affairs (now Rural Development and Land Reform),  and the SA Police Services, to act in the interest of land owners and claimants alike – and the ways in which they themselves break the law with impunity.

 

The Mangete area, near Mandeni, consists of small farms owned by the descendants of nineteenth century settler John Dunn and his numerous Zulu wives. This ownership predates 1913.  In the early 1990s the traditional leader of the adjoining Macambini area orchestrated illegal land invasions, and a campaign of terror and violence, including the burning of sugar cane and buildings, was unleashed against the farmers. Some of the invaders had been removed by the apartheid government in the 1970s, and given land in nearby Wangu. Others – probably the majority – had no historical association with Mangete.  In 1996 the farmers obtained an interim interdict against the chief and the illegal occupants.

 

The interdict could not be finalised because the chief lodged a land claim on behalf of those who had been removed. He tried to show that it was a tribal claim, which it was not, since the claimants had not been members of his tribe. Before the matter could be finalised in the Land Claims Court in 2002 the then Regional Land Claims Commissioner unilaterally concluded a Section 42D settlement, in which land (including a few Mangete farms, and a large commercial farm, which had been purchased) was transferred to the Bhekamafa Trust. This settlement cost taxpayers over fourteen million rand.  The trustees who were appointed were led by the chief, who had never been a claimant, and his associates.

 

Despite the settlement, the illegal occupants remained on Mangete farms, and the campaign of terror and illegal building continued.  The claimants themselves received no benefit from the Trust and those who were not claimants were not moved elsewhere, as was supposed to have happened.  In 2004 the 1996 Interdict was made a final High Court Order,. It ordered those residing on the farms without permission to move or face eviction, and expressly forbad any further entry or building on the farms without the owners’ permission.

 

An attempt to approach the Constitutional Court to force the Department to take action was initiated but, before it could be pursued to that level, the Court itself made a judgment in another matter in which land invasions on a similar scale were also beyond the capability of the landowners to deal with.    In the watershed (and unanimous) Modderklip judgment the Court ruled that, given the magnitude of the invasion and the potential for disruption in executing a court order it was the duty of the state – and not the owners – to provide relief for both the owners and the illegal occupiers. It also ruled that by failing to act the State breached the owners’ constitutional rights. Such invasions had to be prevented for they had serious implications for stability and public peace. Despite the Mangete matter involving a settled claim, as well as widespread land invasions, appeals to the Department of Land Affairs to act in accordance with the settlement, and this judgment, were ignored.

 

The claimants were in an invidious position, especially as the land they had been given when removed in the 1970s, Wangu, had since been incorporated into Macambini. It had apparently been earmarked for the planned multi-billion rand Dubai investment (now defunct) on which they, the rightful owners, were not consulted. They tried to challenge the Mangete settlement in the Land Claims court, but were unsuccessful.  Having received no benefits from the Trust they then approached the Masters Office and, in 2010, were successful in having the trustees appointed in 2002 removed for failure to comply with the terms of the Trust. They were subject to a campaign of threat and intimidation. Several months ago a new Board of Trustees, nominated by the claimants was appointed. Following further threats when the matter of the disappearance of trust earnings was pursued, one of the new trustees was shot and seriously injured in August.

 

The claimants accuse the Department of Land Affairs of failing to assist them, and of acting in collusion with the chief.  In 2011, a delegation from the Department in Pretoria visited the farmers with a view to discussing plans for the area.  They did not know that the claim had been settled. Nor could any departmental documentation be found. The landowners, who had not been a party to settlement, had to make copies of their own documentation for them!

 

To make matters worse, illegal building operations continue, in contravention of the court order and the conduct of the local police has been absolutely disgraceful. On 19 October a woman arrived on Lot 40 and started building. Members of the Saker family, who own and live on the farm, immediately tried to open a trespass case. They were not assisted. Despite a series of sustained interventions aimed at local and Cluster police management since then only a case of trespass has been opened. Contrary to instructions in a December 2003 circular from SAPS Head Office Mandeni police have consistently refused to open a contempt of court case. The station commissioner even denied the existence of a court order – despite his having referred to it in correspondence in 2005 – and then claimed that it was ‘old’ (it is valid for thirty years). Despite umpteen requests, the police have also failed to escort these trespassers off private land – which any landowner is surely entitled to expect of the forces of law and order.

 

It is only after an approach to a member of provincial management that there has been any willingness on the part of the police to do what is required of them.  In the mean time the building has continued, in clear breach of the Order. The owners have had no option but to approach the sheriff, with all the attendant costs and unpleasantness. Again, there has been a delay because of the need to await the services of an acting sheriff in the area (However, the Board for Sheriffs has been helpful and efficient).  It appears that land owned by the Bhekamafa Trust is also being invaded, creating further problems for the claimants, who are still trying to find out where their lands – and the monies due to them – are.

 

It appears that the Department of Land Affairs is in contempt of court for ignoring a constitutional court judgment. The police are apparently defeating the ends of justice by failing to implement the law regarding trespass and contempt of court. This is the very recipe for anarchy which the Constitutional   Court warned about if people could not look to the state to protect people from land invasions, and both the Department of Land Affairs and the SAPS are culpable. Unless fundamental steps are taken to stop government employees themselves breaking the law the situation can only worsen.

 

The chorus of government voices accusing whites – especially former President de Klerk and The Spear artist Brett Murray – of perpetuating colonial stereotypes of black people has become deafening. How ironic then that the same government should promulgate legislation premised on key pillars of colonialism and apartheid: The Traditional Courts bill.  It is thanks to colonialism that, if this bill becomes law, women in KZN will probably be the biggest losers, given the legacy of codified customary law which shaped generations of perceptions about their status. This legislation is an insult to rural residents.

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The basis for what are now termed traditional communities was laid in the newly established colony of Natal in the mid nineteenth century. The British government, busy helping itself to land, sought to contain the indigenous inhabitants in Reserves it set aside for them. Control in these areas would be exercised by chiefs (traditional leaders) and, in areas where none existed (tens of thousands lived without them) Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who administered these ‘tribes’, created new ones. Indirect rule demanded that all indigenous Africans be subjected to chiefs, who were themselves accountable to government functionaries. The African saying that ‘a chief is a chief by his people’ spells out the historical criterion for political leadership, for prior to colonial controls populations could vote with their feet and move away from the jurisdiction of an unpopular leader.  Compliance with colonial policy, as opposed to popular support, became the new criterion for holding office as a chief. Those who did not toe the line were removed.

 

This policy – control over movement (influx control) and indirect rule – was extended to the area north of the uThukela after 1879 and, following the formation of Union in 1910, to the whole of South Africa. Reserve areas became the basis for the Bantustans, where chiefs who were appointed to the legislatures outnumbered members who were placed there following elections (in which few voted).

Chiefs were essential cogs in the Bantustan bureaucracies where, as during colonial times, they were obliged to toe specific political lines. The reserves/Bantustans are now termed traditional communities.

 

To add insult to injury, black people who had lived on freehold land they had acquired prior to 1913, or lived on white owned farms, who had not been subject to chiefs, were forcibly removed to Bantustan reserve areas at the height of apartheid. People living in these traditional communities, on which this legislation plans to impose customary law, are not necessarily where they are by choice. While there is now freedom of movement, their often tenuous right to land (which traditional leaders have been known to deprive them of) may be their only basis of subsistence, especially in the absence of gainful employment.

 

What of the ‘customary law’ which these chiefs’ courts will administer?  Historically the nature of customary law is that it is unwritten, so it is fluid and flexible, and inextricably linked to other shared ideas (culture) of the society of which it is part.  The approach of the colonial government to customary law is summed up in  Shepstone’s argument that it should be recognised ‘to control the natives’. In 1878 the government’s interpretation of this customary law was written down as the infamous Natal Code – the white man’s view of what is good for Zulus, as one legal academic put it. For decades this not-very-customary-law Code remained the only enactment of customary law by a legislature in Africa. It was this Code which consigned women in what is now KZN to perpetual servitude as minors, subject to the control of a male relative. While this provision was done away with by the KwaZulu government in the mid 1980s, the damage to perceptions about women, and their subservient status vis a vis men, had been done. Entrenched ideas do not change overnight simply because the law changes. Women’s struggle for true emancipation is far from over, particularly in the traditional communities with which this legislation deals.

 

What largely escaped attention when the KwaZulu Code changed the legal status of women was the enactment, in the context of the growing liberation momentum, of new, extremely repressive, policing powers for chiefs..  Unsurprisingly a number of these leaders were deeply implicated in political violence and earned reputations as warlords.

 

Apartheid continued and refined the politicisation of chiefship, with those who opposed the status quo either being removed from office or not allowed to succeed to it in the first place. Chiefs wielded great power over their disenfranchised subjects, including through controlling their movement into ‘white’ areas to seek work. The post 1994 government could have depoliticised traditional leadership, as had other post-independent African countries (Swaziland being an exception) In Botswana, e.g. one cannot be both a political incumbent and a chief. Most African countries confine chiefly activities to ceremonial and input on development. However, instead of removing traditional leadership from the sphere of party politics, the ANC has sought to win over IFP supporting leaders in KZN, including through patronage.

 

The degree of community support for traditional leaders depends on whether they are seen to be acting in the interests of their constituencies (patronage also helps). Some are still widely feared. Some break the law with impunity, including by removing people from their ancestral land.  Action is not taken against errant chiefs. One leader, whose involvement in horrific violence is well known, continues to break the law with impunity : His recent transgressions include being in contempt of court, perjury, and making a false declaration to the legislature. The MEC responsible for ensuring that leaders comply with the law does not even respond to letters pointing out breaches of governing legislation.

 

How can traditional leaders act impartially when they are caught up in party political battles? Or when they themselves are accused of complicity in ukuthwala (abduction of young women or girls)? What sort of treatment would they meet out to gays given that a representative body (CONTRALESA) wants constitutional amendments regarding sexual orientation?  Totally unacceptable provisions of the legislation include allowing chiefs to hear minor criminal cases, the ban on legal representation, and limitations on the right to appeal. It is completely contrary to the human rights ethos of our Constitution that rural residents should be obliged to submit to the type of travesty of justice envisaged by this legislation. Under no circumstances should traditional leaders be given any more powers than they already posses.   While credible leaders can play a valuable role in mediating minor civil disputes this service should be optional for those who wish to use it, and should not exclude appeal to a properly constituted court. The ends of promoting peace and harmony in rural communities would be far better served by removing leaders from the sphere of party politics than increasing their judicial powers.

 

To those oppressed by apartheid it was the policing arm of the state which was the most feared because of its brutality in implementing repression. Freedom Day in 1994 was supposed to usher in a new era in which police members would be the custodians of the constitution and its bill of rights, serving communities and ensuring their safety and security. Despite cosmetic attempts to deal with the massive problems the new government inherited, little changed and, eighteen years later, policing generally continues to deteriorate. Instead of protecting people too many police members are persecuting them, including when they open cases against criminal police members. To make matters worse, those tasked with managing the SAPS are failing to intervene and implement the rule of law. The current predicament of Thabiso Zulu of the Creighton area, illustrates the depths to which policing has sunk in KZN.

 

Thabiso Zulu : A background

In 1999 Zulu, a youth development worker, then in his matric year, together with a friend, passed on information about the presence of arms caches in the area to security agents (apparently connected to the newly established Scorpions). Instead of action being taken to remove the weapons and charge those implicated Zulu and his friend  were exposed and harassed, leading to them fleeing the area for several months. When they later returned to their homes nothing had been done about the arms caches despite the fact that members of the SANDF based in the area, together with the police and members of the local Farmwatch regularly raided homes and assaulted people. Many residents, including Zulu, were obliged to sleep away from their homes in fear of these raids, which left at least one person – Basil Jaca – dead (after a rifle butt was pushed into his rectum). Zulu assisted people in obtaining medical treatment and opening cases, and was also instrumental in arranging for the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Nosizwe Madlala-Routlege, to visit deceased Jaca’s family.  However, his community work, and fears for his own life, took a heavy personal and emotional toll on Zulu. By the end of 2000 – when KZN Monitor made further urgent appeals to the police – including to the then national commissioner – to deal with the anarchy the guns circulating in the area were linked to taxi violence.

 

The situation in the area has improved considerably in the past decade. Zulu, who has outstanding leadership abilities, has continued with his youth development and community work, including by organising anti-crime initiatives together with the police. He served two terms as the first regional secretary of the ANCYL, and is currently serving on the provincial interim leadership core of the Young Communist League.

 

The current predicament

During January 2012 the Tactical Response Team (TRT), established in 2009 by suspended national commissioner Bheki Cele, conducted operations in the Umzimkhulu/Creighton/Donnybrook/Himeville area falling under the Port Shepstone policing cluster. Using what seem to be their normal tactics members visited the licensed tavern run by Timothy Maduna on 12 January, assaulted Maduna and his patrons, and damaged tavern property.  Zulu assisted Maduna to open a case (with some difficulty) at the local police station.  There were also assaults on a number of other residents in these areas. Zulu was among those assaulted, apparently because he had complained to senior police members about TRT conduct. On 27 January he was assaulted for the second time in front of a crowd of people at a garage at Donnybrook. He recognised his assailants as being the same group who had previously assaulted him but they were not in uniform this time. He received medical attention. He then opened a case against the members.  Despite requests to the Port Shepstone Cluster Commander to withdraw these members from the area they continued to harass people, and those who had opened cases received anonymous threatening phone calls.

 

Having received information from credible sources that his life was in danger, Zulu removed his wife and one year old son from their home, went into hiding himself, and paid someone to safeguard his property.  After cases were opened identity parades should have taken place, but this process was constantly stalled by the police (e.g. refusing to supply the names of members on duty), despite appeals to management. The disappearance of incriminating CCTV footage was allegedly linked to the interference of a police member.  The situation improved following the ICD (now IPID) taking over the cases in late February, but delaying tactics on the part of the police continued. On more than one occasion victims and witnesses were taken to Scottburgh for an ID parade to take place only to find that all the police members required for the parade had not been brought to the venue (wasting everyone’s time and money.  Zulu received credible information that this delaying tactic was a deliberate attempt to sabotage the case.

 

While this process dragged on, Zulu remained in hiding, away from his wife and child. Then, on 16 March, there was a new, sinister development.

 

Enter self confessed armed robber Bruce Mhlongo

Zulu’s wife Thobile has continued with her job in a rural town. On 16 March, around lunch time, three men in plain clothes visited her place of work. Her colleagues informed them that she was on her lunch break. These men left a message stating that Bruce Mhlongo from Pietermaritzburg was looking for her, and that she should telephone him (he left a telephone number) for he and his companions would be waiting at the local police station (they were not there).  Mrs Zulu left work early and spent the weekend at a safe home with her child.

 

Alleged police informer Bruce Mhlongo, who was very close to the lateRichmondleader Sifiso Nkabinde, as well as a policeman who was linked to the violence in that area, has a long association with violent crime. As well as having admitted to participating in an armed robbery in which two people died – he escaped justice through turning state witness – he was also implicated in the theft of rifles from the Pietermaritzburg Murder and Robbery Unit.

 

It has been confirmed that the telephone number left at Thobile’s work place is that of Mhlongo – which raises questions about (a)who deployed him and (b) what the intention was in calling on Thobile. Was harm intended – or was it hoped that this news would bring her husband out of hiding, to a possible death?

 

Holding the Minister, the MEC and SAPS management accountable

Zulu still in hiding. Both he and his wife are suffering emotionally and financially. He claims that his telephone is constantly interfered with – especially when he tries to talk to his wife – and his emails are hacked. This may well be true given media reports that police members often engage in illegal interception of communications. He has been told by informed sources that if he drops the case, and persuades others whom he assisted to open cases to also withdraw theirs, the threats and harassment will stop.

 

All this suffering is a consequence of his having exercised his fundamental right to open a case against criminal police who have assaulted him, and assisted others to do likewise. KZN Monitor has drawn this state of affairs to the attention of the national minister, the provincial MEC, the chair of the provincial legislature committee, and provincial, deputy provincial, and cluster commander management members, without any success (or even acknowledgement).

 

KZN Monitor believes that Zulu should be reunited with his wife and child, and that they should be able to live in their own home without fear of attack – and that it is the job of police management to ensure they are safe.  Should Zulu decide to follow this course of action – and should any harm whatsoever befall him, his wife, or child, the minister and the MEC, together with police management, will be held accountable.

 

Zulu is not the only one to have suffered for trying to hold abusive police accountable – and if nothing is done by the powers that be to rein in and discipline the SAPS by a complete overhaul of management structures no one will be safe.

 

 

Note that all the events detailed are documented in correspondence with the police and political leaders and in KZN Monitor reports, including ‘The Scorpions : Trial by Media’. There has also been media coverage, including of the events involving the SANDF and FarmWatch in 2000