The Violence Monitor

Glebelands resident Sipho Ndovela, a father of eight whose family lives in the impoverished Eastern Cape, was shot dead just outside the Umlazi court at about 11h00 this morning. The deceased was a key witness in a murder case set for trial in the High Court. His testimony would have implicated the alleged key warlord and extortionist in the hostel complex, linked to countless attacks and many of the estimated 25 deaths in the hostel during the past year – a warlord who appears to enjoy police protection and possibly assistance with weapons.. When Ndovela took the brave step of coming forward as a witness to the murder of Fikile Siyephu in February – an incident in which he was injured – the investigating officer (who was himself implicated in the torturing of a roman by ‘tubing’ her) effectively interfered with the course of justice by telling him to omit mention of the role of the warlord in his sworn statement because it was not relevant. Following legal advice Ndovela was to make a supplementary statement to the Umlazi police this afternoon, but was killed before he could do so. He had received threats that he would ‘not see court’ and there had already been one attempt to kill him. He was shot dead, execution style, as he stepped outside to either make or take a telephone call (he was in court facing charges relating to a brawl in a tavern in 2014). The serious danger to his life had been communicated to the police at all levels, and to the MEC. Given all the warnings police management and the MEC’s office have had, and the information which has been made available in the public arena, there is no excuse whatsoever for failing to protect potential victims. Heads must roll.
Since early 2014 human rights defender Vanessa Burger has meticulously documented incidents of violence in Glebelands, and the plight of those targeted by thugs; these victims include women with Protection Orders who have not been assisted by the police. She has put out numerous media statements, including a recent one drawing attention to the plight of witnesses – including Ndovela – who are under threat. The Daily News recently gave extensive coverage to their plight.
In 2014 letters were sent to Umlazi and Provincial management about the alleged collusion between thus and police members, torture by police members, and the presence of police issue weapon/s and ammunition by the thugs. These letters were copied to, among others, the MEC. There was no response. The killings continued, with no evidence of any fundamental steps having been taken to protect Glebelands residents, despite public announcements about almost R10 million being spent for security at the complex. As attacks continued and it was clear that the lives of certain witnesses, including Ndovela’s were in grave danger, an urgent letter was addressed to Umlazi Cluster and Station management, as well as the Provincial Commissioner and the MEC, on 21 April, pointing out their failure to act on previous letters and asking a number of public interest questions. The danger posed to witnesses – including Sipho Ndovela – was stressed, together with a request to ensure their safety. They were also advised in this letter that
Your police will be held responsible should any harm befall them since
you have all the means at our disposal to take preventive action.
This letter elicited no reponse, except from IPID who immediately requested the police to follow up on the complaints and report back to the writer. Three weeks letter there has been no report back.
Umlazi SAPS management has failed in its constitutional mandate to prevent crime and to protect the people at Glebelands, It must be replaced forthwith.
Nor can provincial management claim ignorance, given the letters copied to it and the fact that IPID too referred the Monitor’s complaint to provincial management – raising further questions about the fitness of the Provincial Commissioner to hold office. The buck stops with the MEC, who has also been apprised of the situation in Glebelands through letters copied to his office but appears to have done nothing to ensure that extremely serious Umlazi policing problems are addressed. If South Africa were truly a democracy, the honourable thing to do would be for him to resign, or at least take responsibility for the conduct of the provincial and Umlazi police. However, given the general lack of accountability, and sheer arrogance, of politicians holding important positions, that seems unlikely. Eight more poor children have joined the dozens already left fatherless because of the failure to deal ensure that Umlazi police fulfil their Constitutional mandate. Thousands of people died in this province in the cause of the liberation which gave these same politicians their positions – but liberation is a hollow victory for those who continue to die because the ANC controlled police collude with criminals.

‘Now Everyone is Afraid’, the title of a 1988 book about abuses by the apartheid police and their surrogates, is an appropriate description of South Africa twenty one years after the first democratic elections. Democracy has not banished fear – it is everywhere. Fear of the police is still widespread, especially among victims of continuing police abuse, including torture. Fear of violent crime is endemic, and threat and intimidation is rife, especially (but not exclusively) in poorer communities. Whether protests are about service delivery or the removal of colonial symbols the tactics used are either overtly violent or intimidatory. Like tantrums thrown by children trying to get their own way the threat of violence is used instead of the normal democratic options of showing displeasure through the ballot box and reasoned debate. As one conscientious police member (and there are many) aptly put it, when the violence against foreigners erupted, ‘There is no law’ Despite our outstanding Constitution, the laws which should be giving it teeth are constantly broken with impunity. The lawlessness is a consequence of serious problems with the criminal justice system, especially with policing. Violence, however, has far deeper roots, and is inherent in the essentially unchanged structure of our country since 1994, including its impoverished and underdeveloped rural areas and squalid, badly policed urban hostels. The current state of near anarchy, coupled with structural inequality and a growing culture of secrecy and unaccountability on the part of government has extremely serious consequences for what is essentially as nascent – and fragile democracy.
Why everyone is afraid
Crime, fuelled by factors such as powerless, prison gangs and criminal syndicates, long predates democracy (and the arrival of Nigerians) in South Africa. It has flourished since 1994, becoming an overt presence, and spreading fear, in the formerly ‘whites only’ parts of the country. Those who can afford it rely on private security services to safeguard their homes. Women and children live in fear of rape. All travellers run the gauntlet of potential hijacking, rock throwing and smash-and-grab thugs (not to mention criminal drivers). However, the safety of those living in apartheid’s townships and rural reserves – and relying on taxi transport – is the most precarious (as evidenced by murder statistics) Historically, these areas bore the brunt of poor policing and, while there has been improvement in some places (depending on the quality of station management), rural areas remain grossly under-resourced and stations often too far apart to offer adequate protection to all.
The policing of large, colonial era hostel complexes is particularly problematic, especially when police members themselves are complicit when serious violent crimes are committed, as in Glebelands hostel The climate of fear is palpable, with men, women and children – including witnesses in court cases – living under constant threat of attack from thugs protected by police.
Many taxi operators, too, fear violence, with some spending much of their lives in hiding. In the volatileMaphumulo/KwaDukuza/Mandini areas the ongoing conflict is linked to alleged irregularity in the issuing of permits, and internal struggles linked to the use of known hit men and certain police members.. Marandi Mthethwa, one of those harassed by members of the Cato Manor ‘hit squad’ is the latest victim, and was buried on Freedom Day. His former colleague, Dalisu Sangweni was assassinated at his Outer West home in March, a month after his colleague Charles Khuzwayo met a similar fate. Both attacks appear linked to their investigations into alleged SANTACO (the government taxi body) corruption, and their unsuccessful attempts to extract public interest information from eThekwini Transport Department..
A Melmoth a church minister and community leader is also living under threat of death following an inaccurate, inflammatory and defamatory media article in a Zulu language paper – which appears linked to his working with community members opposed to open cast iron ore mining by a huge international mining conglomerate in the area. .
Short and long term solutions to freedom from fear
Without an effective criminal justice system crime will continue to thrive. The democratic government’s handling of policing has been little short of disastrous since it assumed office. In the name of affirmative action it rewarded incompetence and, with some exceptions, sidelined competence. Like the NPA and intelligence services policing, has deteriorated even further during the past few years as a result of increased political interference. It is only when political meddling ceases and all appointments to management are made on the basis of merit – proven competence and integrity -, that a start can be made to remedying the glaring wrongs of the criminal justice system. There is no indication that this will happen.
In 21 years virtually nothing has done to break the cycle of violence rooted in the past to which succeeding generations of children remain subject. Despite huge funding, there is virtually no true development in the impoverished rural labour reservoirs of the former Bantustans. Traditional leadership continues to jeopardise land security in many areas, and unemployment in the agricultural sector has shrunk considerably, so migration to urban areas continues. Migrants often end up in or around hostels which have historically been known for high levels of violence which scar children for life. Children continue to suffer violence at home and school, and often lack the presence of appropriate male role models in their lives. Those who grow up in such circumstances perpetuate the cycle of violence – and violence thrives in an environment of powerlessness, since it gives those who use it a sense of power. Simply having a vote does not in itself empower people, especially if they are badly educated, poor, and the recipients of patronage rather than being actively involved in decisions about their own lives.
The government has had 21 years to change the colonial era structure of society, and the bantu education legacy and it must take responsibility for not having done so. If it does not have the will to make changes the culture of violence and fear will remain with us for the foreseeable future, thwarting progress to true democracy, and threatening the existing order.

Thandazile* is twenty-nine, unemployed and has four children including a nine-month-old baby. She was one of the dozens of women violently evicted by heavily armed men at Glebelands Hostel last year. Her partner was a block committee member – the hostel structure formerly responsible for room allocation, most of whose members’ names reportedly appear on a ‘hit list’, seemingly used by thugs and police alike. Twenty-one block committee members or their associates are now dead.

Thandazile was not at home when they came for her partner, but her six-year-old son was. The terrible violence witnessed by this young child has affected his temperament and schooling. Like many other Glebelands children, he is believed to be suffering from post traumatic stress disorder.

After fleeing her home, Thandazile settled at a nearby informal settlement. However, with her partner now in hiding, homeless, now unemployed and unable to support her, she could not afford the R500 monthly shack rental on an income of only R930 – the child grants she received for her children. The area was also extremely unsafe.

When Thandazile returned to Glebelands to plead with the hostel superintendent for help with accommodation, she was turned away. She had lost all her possessions during the eviction and her baby was then two months old. Eventually Thandazile found shelter in a derelict building without electricity, water or sanitation. She cannot look for work because she must protect her children. Her family live in constant fear after a man tried to gain access to her room. Her children’s screams luckily drove him away. This time. The area is frequently used by Glebelands’ killers for target practice.

Thandazile’s children’s birth certificates and school uniforms were stolen from the room last year. The Department of Home Affairs charges R20 per copy, so duplicate birth certificates are a luxury she simply cannot afford. To gain admission to a place of safety, criteria demand that Thandazile must provide a police case number, copies of her children’s birth certificates and be able to prove her situation is likely to improve after a limited stay at a shelter. However she fears reprisals if she lays charges against those who evicted her, and after a female hostel resident was tortured by police last year, Thandazile is now as fearful of the police as she is of those who evicted her.

Sources claim the instigator of the violence is a police informer, formerly of KwaMashu Hostel, criminally connected to Jacobs Hostel, with a fake SAPS identity card, political affiliations and a weakness for truckjacking. He is rumoured to be charging protection money and after each hostel hit, has reportedly splashed out on new furniture or a new car. After the murder of Vusi Ngema – a close associate of the local ward councilor in July last year – it was alleged this individual installed hit squad members from Mandeni – Ngema’s home town – at Block C. These men are suspected of luring Phumlani Ndlovu – an associate of the block committee members – to his death in an ambush early this year for which it seems no arrests have been made. The same individual is witnessed regularly in the company of a Durban Central SAPS officer who, it has been suggested, may have supplied the military issue heavy caliber firearm used frequently during the 2014 violence. The names and addresses of these individuals are well known to residents, community leaders and organizations that have been assisting the hostel dwellers. So too are the names of the Umlazi SAPS officers with whom these men allegedly associate, and who have been implicated in incidents of torture and widely condemned for their reported collusion and utter failure to investigate and take effective action against perpetrators of the violence.

KwaZulu-Natal Premier, Senzo Mchunu, failed to acknowledge the social impact of the ongoing violence, displacements, dispossession, psychological trauma and highly questionable police conduct when he declared unilateral peace at a mass community meeting at Glebelands on 28 September 2014. The SAPS has since blamed its poor arrest- and even worse -conviction rate on residents’ reluctance to “work hand in hand with the police”. After numerous reports of police torture and brutality, collusion and questionable conduct, such statements are simply disingenuous and unhelpful.

At a meeting convened by the Commission for Gender Equality on 14 October last year, a detailed needs analysis was presented regarding the psychological and socioeconomic impact of the Glebelands violence on vulnerable members of the community – particularly the unemployed, women and children. At the time, Department of Social Development provincial representatives undertook to establish a task team comprising of all relevant departmental stakeholders in order to assist vulnerable residents. Since this meeting, other than the provision of a few food parcels to a handful of women, the DSD has been noticeable by its absence throughout the ongoing Glebelands crisis.

At the recent Social Work Indaba held at Durban’s ICC, the DSD minister expressed “the need to regenerate the social work practice to make it relevant to current issues facing South African society.” Where could be more “relevant to current issues” than to begin the “regeneration of the social work practice”, with the women of Glebelands Hostel? But that would be expecting too much of a department that routinely neglects the needs of its staff and the public. Durban’s involvement in ‘stakeholder engagement forums’ such as the Rockefeller Foundation-funded “100 Resilient Cities Programme”, is also deeply ironic when it is residents’ ‘resilience’ that is needed against the onslaught of the state.

Hostel block committee structures must be reinstated to ensure community stability; local and provincial leaders must prioritise human life over political power struggles; the police must perform there duties without fear or favour; and the DSD must enable its staff to undertake meaningful intervention at Glebelands. Nothing less will end the misery for Thandazile, her young family, and Glebelands’ women for whom social justice, gender equality, and human and constitutional rights are parodied in the rhetoric and dishonesty, which has, to date, signified the government’s sole response to ending the hostel violence.

*Thandazile’s real name has been withheld to protect her identity

THIS JOINT STATEMENT WAS ISSUED TO THE PRESS BY KZN MONITOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER VANESSA BURGER

There is a certain irony to the preoccupation with symbols of the past – especially the statue of arch imperialist Cecil John Rhodes – when colonial-cum-apartheid policies remain in place. The land dispossession with which Rhodes is associated was initiated b
ecause of the demand for vast amounts of cheap labour for the mines; it also served the purpose of destroying the black peasantry which competed successfully with expanding white commercial farming. Together with labour migrancy and the accompanying controls over black movement went single sex hostels and the virtual destruction of black family life. Despite the current land reform rhetoric the land rights of poor rural residents are under serious threat – and despite some cosmetic changes the colonial system of indirect rule through chiefs remains in place and retards the development of democracy. The type of gross abuse of power associated with the apartheid police, including the use of torture, flourishes. Where are the priorities of the ‘Rhodes must fall’ brigade? Are lifeless statues more important than the sufferings of the living?
Land rights an government double-speak
The public focus is on government rhetoric about redressing land imbalances and recent legislation has re-opened the land claims process. However, many of the claims s lodged in the 1990s have not yet been settled, and serious allegations of gross incompetence and corruption in the Department responsible for land reform have not been addressed. At the same time, there are very real threats to rural people’s indigenous land rights, especially by the Ingonyama Trust in KZN. This Trust, which was established days before the April 1994 elections, transferred former KwaZulu Bantustan land, and other land earmarked for black occupation, to Zulu king Zwelithini, and a Board administers it on his behalf. It was this Trust which in 2000 awarded a lease to the traditional leader near Mbazwana (northern KZN) to operate a private game lodge – and which failed to intervene when a large area was fenced, denying people access to their homes, to water, and to their subsistence activities. The residential rights of people living in traditional communities are guaranteed by the Protection of Informal Land Rights Act but, according to the Trust, it is now issuing leases for residential rights on this type of land, potentially endangering the rights of existing residents (and earning more income for the Trust, which enjoys a surplus of millions of rand). Leaders claim that most revenues siphoned off from traditional areas do not flow back to benefit communities..
The conduct of chiefs varies considerably, with some ensuring wide community consultation and others abusing their power – including by driving people of their land (with no constructive action taken by government departments). More usually, residents are obliged to pay all sorts of monies to the leadership on various pretexts, and women complain that they are expected to provide sexual favours for some leaders (some of whom have allegedly been implicated in the ukuthwala practice of forced abduction of young women). Babanango residents are up in arms about King Zwelethini’s plans to build a new palace on what they claim is their ancestral land. There are also outstanding land claims in the area, and many who lodged claims in the 1990s are concerned that they may lose out to new claimants. (and rumours abound of Land Reform staff and politicians using the new claim period to take over land to which they are not entitled -such is the mistrust of the land claims process (see land report).
A number of communities in KZN face the threat of removal and/or the degradation of their environment through mining – especially the extension of titanium mining to areas around Mthunzini, the threat of coal mining in the Mfolosi Wilderness area, and the planned open cast iron ore mining around Melmoth, where the Ingonyama Trust Board has reportedly given its permission for the mining. As under apartheid, rural areas remain underdeveloped labour reservoirs, and the mining companies involved in these latest initiatives are multinational conglomerates in partnership with shadowy ‘empowerment’ companies. The exploitation of colonialism continues, augmented by the ‘empowerment’ of selected black partners, many of whom are alleged to be politically well connected.
Hostels and police brutality
While some family accommodation has been built in single sex hostel complexes huge numbers of men, women and children continue to live in overcrowded and often run down single sex hostels. Like the abuses in rural areas, the problems stemming from these colonial structures are compounded by political struggles and corruption. In Glebelands (Umlazi) the abuse of residents is carried out not by the notorious apartheid ‘blackjacks’ but by democracy’s police. At least 21 people have reportedly died in this complex in the past year and countless numbers of residents have been forcibly evicted from their rooms. Democratically elected block structure members and their women folk and children are the primary target of these evictions allegedly carried out by a known thug from KwaMashu hostels and his associates, who then oversee the allocation of beds to others, probably for a fee. This well armed thug is said to enjoy a close relationship with the local, highly unpopular councillor. The blame for this state of affairs lies with the police who should be preventing crime and arresting perpetrators but are instead abusing those targeted for eviction, including by the use of the notorious ‘tubing ‘ torture beloved of the apartheid police (one of the victims was a woman) At the heart of this anarchy lies the complete lack of transparency in bed allocation policy by the municipality with allegations – as in housing allocation – of interference by councillors dispensing political patronage..
Debates about colonial symbols are pertinent, but not if they are hijacked by thuggish behaviour – which, ironically, is replete with the racist rhetoric rooted in the colonialism of which they complain. Surely it is up to universities to insist that debates be properly informed and contextualised. The Roman empire, for example, was a brutal coloniser but do we not continue to enjoy the benefits of its legacy? If the universities simply give in to anarchy, rather than take a stand for orderly and reasoned debate, they may well end up producing a flock of sheep rather than the critical thinkers democracy needs to survive, let alone to thrive.

On the night of Sunday 15 March prominent taxi operator Azarius Dalisu Sangweni was shot dead outside his KwaDabeka home. His assassination followed that of his colleague Charles Khuzwayo, who was shot dead outside of his Pinetown home a month earlier. Both of the deceased were leading members of the Durban West Interim Committee attempting to engage with eThewini municipality to procure documents it had signed with SANTACO (the government funded Taxi Council) about the implementation of the Integrated Rapid Public Transport Network (IRPTN), known locally as GoDurban. Sangweni had also put his name to a working document titled ‘Alleged maladministration, wasteful and fruitless expenditure’ which, he hoped, would ultimately lead for an investigation into both the Department of Transport and SANTACO by the Public Protector. Among the millions wasted was expenditure on hiring an aeroplane, and associated costs, to advertise the supposed launch of Santaco Airlines – which never materialised. The hits on Sangweni and Khuzwayo followed the same pattern, including insofar as they occurred after they had attended meetings at nearby Kranskloof hostel. There are now serious concerns for the safety of associates of the deceased who were working to demand transparency and accountability from government departments, including members of the Durban West Interim Committee , and the Taxi Alliance, whose names are known to KZN Monitor but are being withheld at their request.

The much publicised GoTransport system involving new bus and train networks is forging ahead, with reports of infrastructural development such as new depots for Rea Vaya buse, including at Pinetown and Inanda. This new transport system is financed by the National Treasury, and involves collaboration between different levels of government (national, provincial and local). This new system is clearly going to have a major impact on taxi services in urban areas, with reports that fewer people are using this mode of transport at Inanda since the introduction of new rail and bus links. Despite the Thekwini municipality claiming that there has been full stakeholder engagement, and that the taxi leadership has signed a Memorandum of Agreement with city leaders about participation, most taxi operators do not know what the terms of the agreement are. What they suspect is happening is that taxi operations will be confined to areas outside of wherever this national transport policy is being implemented, and that they will simply drop off passengers at designated urban points.

Not all taxi associations and operators are affiliated with SANTACO and, within that government structure, communication between leadership and those who vote their representatives into office is said to be poor. Despite the huge expenditure, even members were not told about the Santaco Airline fiasco, and nor did the Department provide information; it was left to a KZN newspaper to uncover the truth of what had happened. The government will apparently only deal with SANTACO, and will not provide information to other taxi bodies except through their lawyers.. Where is democracy, transparency and accountability to the taxpayers, including the late Sangweni and Khuzwayo, who pay the salaries of the Department of Transport, and finance SANTACO ?

When a promised presentation by SANTACO did not materialise, Sangweni was among those whose signatures were on letters to the municipality requesting permission to march and hand over a memorandum about their demands during latter 2014, and the request to the eThekwini Transport Authority for a copy of the memorandum it had signed with SANTACO. Initially he and his associates were told that they could collect a copy but, on their return, they were allegedly told that SANTACO had threatened to sue if they released the memorandum because there were ‘secrecy clauses’

This conduct by the Department of Transport and its extension, SANTACO, and the eThekwini municipality is yet another manifestation of a growing culture of authoritarianism and secrecy, which is the antithesis of the spirit of the Constitution. It must not be allowed to continue. The public, including taxi operators, must have access to whatever documentation has been signed between the municipality and SANTACO.

It seems that the quest for their constitutional right to transparency may have killed Sangweni and Khuzwayo. According to a former associate, he had withdrawn from the process of demanding accountability after he received a tip off that his life was in danger if he ‘fought with the government’ about its policy. These chilling words have serious implications for the safety of those working with Sangweni. His funeral is on Human Rights Day -the day celebrating the rights for which he died.

Those calling for the reinstatement of Bheki Cele as National SAPS Commissioner seem not understand the nature of the crisis in policing, how it impacts upon cime, and the type of remedial action which is sorely needed, No matter which position he occupies Cele remains a dedicated ANC loyalist. Cadre deployment has proven disastrous and only when the policing reins are handed to well trained, professional police members can the long road to transformation from apartheid-style policing begin..
Cele is a charismatic and populist politician – qualities which he brought to the SAPS; hence, no doubt, the calls for his return. However, popularity is a likely hindrance in implementing a long overdue, ruthless cleanup, including by disciplining and dismissing errant members. The current appalling state of policing is the consequence of twenty years of bungling and political interference..
Shortly before the 1994 elections a senior Nationalist Party representative made a remarkably candid admission: It was impossible to purge the police, he said, because ‘you’d be lucky if you were left with 10% of them’. While it was known that many in the upper echelons were far to the right of de Klerk and had not welcomed his reforms, KZN Monitor research during the 1990s suggested that dismissing 90% of police as beyond redemption was a gross exaggeration. The problem lay with the ultra-conservative, corrupt nature of much of the management, and the integration of homeland police forces whose training was (with some exceptions) far inferior to that received in the SAP, who had also been used as political foot soldiers. What the research documented in detail in the 1990s in KZN was rampant racism, nepotism, and members (many of them of a ‘ja baas’ mentality) being promoted well beyond their levels of competence in what was essentially tokenism. Many former security police members who had colluded in gross human rights abuses (but never approached the TRC) were promoted to senior positions, and most of the African members promoted in this province were from the former KZP. Many experienced, long serving previously disadvantaged SAP members with clean records were not rewarded with promotion, and left the police. This trend has continued until the present time as policing has lurched from bad to worse. While political dynamics in the 1990s played a part, the ANC, both nationally and provincially, colluded in the travesty of transformation.
From the outset the ANC messed up badly in its approach to policing. Instead of promoting experienced people with clean track records, who were not members of notorious apartheid units such as SANAB and he security police (they were interchangeable), it placed its own cadres within the ranks of the police. At best they were ineffectual, at worst their interventions were disastrous. They did not understand policing culture and were completely out of their depths. Some of them, like Selebi (who had been internationally respected in human rights circles) were, like many of their comrades in government, corrupted by the power that was handed to them. The end result was that policing continued to deteriorate, and specialised units which are at the core of fighting crime – detective services and Crime Intelligence – became increasingly dysfunctional and subverted to serve political ends. At the same time, the good guys – and there are still many of them – risk their lives (often because of corrupt colleagues), without acknowledgement or the reward of promotion. Almost three months ago a letter sent to both national and provincial ministers about detectives who had done sterling work in bringing down levels of violence being completely sidelined did not even get a response, let alone any action It seems that competence counts for nothing in the new SAPS.
Abuse, including torture, and killings by the police continued after 1994, but have escalated in recent years, especially since the message went out to ‘shoot to kill’. Marikana was simply a consequence of a well established pattern of police conduct, entrenched during the Cele tenure. The new unit he established – the TRT (amaberets) – who were well represented at Marikana, are notorious for their brutality. Quite apart from the illegality of their actions, and their gross human rights violations, such conduct does nothing to stem crime. The abuse of suspects can destroy court cases, and, even if those shot are criminals, they should be identified before they kill people, and neutralised by an effective crime intelligence and criminal justice system. Crime pays, and that is why it is rampant – because of the atrocious state of the criminal justice system, starting with the police.
During a recent discussion about policing with a committed ANC cadre (who has good reason to dislike apartheid era policemen) the subject of Johann Booysen’s reinstatement to the SAPS came up (Booysen was the commander of the Cato Manor Organized Crime Unit, members of which are facing numerous charges of ‘hitsquad’ killings; he was reinstated after charges against him fell away). The cadre’s response = ‘What difference does it make’ – reflected the widespread disillusionment with the police, despite control over them having shifted to the ANC government. Apartheid police were brutal and corrupt, but they were at least well trained and efficient. Like their predecessors, far too many of the democratic era police are exceedingly brutal and corrupt – but they are also grossly inefficient. South Africa has had twenty years of nepotism and tokenism posturing as affirmative action : There has been no fundamental transformation from apartheid policing.
Cadre deployment must be stopped, and promotions to management, including national and provincial commissioners, must be made on the basis, not of race or political affiliation – but on that of being long serving, well trained members with clean, proven track records and management skills. It is, of course, unlikely that the powers that be would buy into that – but if they do not they will continue to expose themselves as emperors without clothes when they mouth meaningless platitudes about fighting crime

‘There’s not a rich man there, who couldn’t pay his way, and buy the freedom that’s a high price for the poor’. So goes songwriter and activist Graham Nash’s poignant Prison Song – a song with a particular resonance for South Africa where the powerful may evade justice, and where the poor (some of them innocent of any crime) may languish in prison, facing rape, or even death, at the hands of prison gangs. Far too often the quest for justice by the powerless is thwarted, whereas cases involving the rich and famous not only receive priority attention from the police (and well paid private investigators) but draw on the services of top – and hugely expensive – lawyers who are able to pick holes in what are often poorly investigated cases. Unlike the Pistorius or Dewani cases, the vast majority of murders never reach court, let alone lead to convictions. Three recent cases show some of the obstacles the majority of families of crime victims face in their quest for justice.

In 2007 Dundee councillor Grisham Bujram was murdered, ostensibly because of his attempts to expose corruption in the municipality. While they had not orchestrated the hit, two men were convicted of the killing. A third alleged accomplice, together with one of the convicted men, claimed that they had killed Bujram on the instructions of the then mayor who subsequently stood trial. However, the case dragged on, with postponements linked to the accused’s alleged ill-health. The state witness conveniently disappeared, and the accused was acquitted for lack of evidence. There has been no closure for the family, traumatised by the long drawn-out proceedings, since the identity of the mastermind has not been confirmed. Nor has there been any follow up of the corruption which they believe was behind their loved-one’s death. Mrs Bujram also claims that she has been threatened for pursuing this matter, and that there have been incidents which appear to have been attempts on her life.

Mr X, a taxi operator was killed, together with an acquaintance who was giving him a lift, when their car was riddled with bullets by police members pursuing them. Not long before he died X had made a statement to the police that he feared being killed by other taxi operators colluding with the police because he refused to pay extortion money. Despite the gravity of the matter, and potentially incriminating evidence, IPID failed conspicuously to do its duty, leaving the investigation to a local detective who was accused of colluding with X’s opponents. This detective denied that Y, the policeman named in the shooting (who allegedly had taxi interests), had been at the scene. However, that Y was implicated in the incident was confirmed by, among others, his unit commander. Due to the extremely shoddy investigation there has been no prosecution and now, according to the family’s lawyer, important evidence has disappeared from the docket.

Nor has Leonie Luckin seen justice done after her only daughter, Leanne. died, in September 2013, when police who had chased her for many kilometres along the N2 fired at her car, causing her to die of injuries sustained when it crashed. The deceased, who lived on the lower South Coast, had opened a case against the police before she died (she had told her mother a police member had tried to bribe her). According to a witness at the shooting scene, cited in a press report, the police not only failed to assist the dying woman, but interfered with the crime scene by removing the vehicle. Follow up of the case by IPID appeared slow, and it is not known whether the vehicle – which was left standing at the insurer’s premises – was ever subject to a thorough examination. According to Mrs Luckin, she has had no information about who the police were, why they were chasing her daughter, and whether reports about police conduct at the scene of the crash have been investigated. She has simply been informed by IPID that prosecution has been declined, and that the case will proceed to inquest.

What is of great concern in this and other cases in which there has been no prosecution is that victims’ relatives are not informed about their right to apply for a formal inquest. It appears that it is left to the discretion of magistrates to decide on whether to hold a formal inquest hearing or simply file the matter away. At the very least, cases in which the police have killed people should automatically be subject to a formal inquest at which families enjoy competent legal representation.. This court procedure may be denied victims’ families because they do not know their rights, nor do they usually have access to quality legal assistance.

The dismal conviction rate for murder is due to a number of factors, starting with the appalling state of policing – especially detective services and crime intelligence – the failure of the prosecuting service to guide investigators and ensure quality evidence and, in some cases, poor prosecution. Nor does the disappearance of ballistics evidence from police custody help the cause of justice.. That the disgraceful state of crucial forensic services – broken x-ray machines and scales, incompetent, ill-disciplined staff and insufficient well trained pathologists – also defeats the ends of justice is shown by the recent well publicised trial of men accused of killing British marine Brett Williams. The blame for this state of affairs lies with the departments and ministers concerned – including the provincial Department of Health and its MEC who must take personal responsibility for the virtual collapse of the forensic pathology services which can make or break justice in the province. Ultimately, it is the complete lack of accountability, and arrogance, of elected officials, which is responsible for the vast majority of South Africans being denied justice in cases of violent crime.

The recent murder of Senzo Meyiwa was indeed tragic – but so are all murders. To slightly re-work poet John Donne’s immortal words, ‘each death diminishes us for we are part of humanity’

Overseas readers and viewers following the Oscar Pistorius trial are probably impressed by the high standards of South African court proceedings (even if the revelations about police bungling, incompetence and downright dishonesty shocked them). This case, like that of alleged wife killer Shrien Dewani, shows only one side of the coin where the vast majority of victims of serious crime cry out for the justice denied them because of shoddy investigative (including forensic) work, poor prosecution versus good legal defence, and the intimidation of witnesses (especially if strict control is not exercised over the granting of bai)l. At the same time, the constitutional rights of persons accused of crimes, and those who have been convicted, are constantly violated. People are frequently arrested, and may be released without being charged or, or may be denied bail only to have charges subsequently withdrawn. During their incarceration they may suffer abuse and torture. Unlike Dewani, who has been assured that he will be held in a ‘secure unit’, the majority of prisoners risk suffering sexual violence, or even death, in communal cells. The Pistorius trial is taking place a year after his lover was killed but far too many cases drag on for years. with continuing postponements of court cases. Whatever the outcome of the Pistorius and Dewani trials the families of victims will at least achieve a measure of closure. That closure is seldom available when the police are the perpetrators, or when the victims lack public visibility because they live in rural areas and/or are poor.

Continuing police abuse
In 1992 the then apartheid police minister was castigated because 114 people had died in police custody. According to latest IPID report, over double that number – 275 – died in custody during the 2012/13 year (431 people died in police action). Why has this minister not been censured? Media reports of extreme police brutality are probably the tip of the iceberg. KZN Monitor is currently following up a case in the south Durban region in which four victims were arrested and were allegedly abused.. One man died. Those who survived were released without being charged.

Without constant follow up by family and/or human rights defenders , feedback to families of people killed by the police is usually tardy or non-existent. The family of Nqobile Nzuza who was shot dead in Cato Crest six months ago have reportedly heard nothing from the investigator – despite the availability of witnesses, ballistics evidence, a private autopsy, and (presumably) police records regarding the identity of the police members deployed to the area.

However, no matter how much trouble victims, and those who intervene on their behalf, take in their quest for justice, they are often left wondering why they had even bothered in the first place. In
2012 KZNMonitor reported abuses by the TRT (Tactical Response Team) of dozens of victims in the Creighton/Himeville/Umzimkhulu region. One of those who did not rest in his quest for justice for both himself and the other victims was Thabiso Zulu. He appears to have suffered abuse because he challenged this illegal police conduct. As a consequence of severe threat and intimidation to himself and his family he went into hiding, which impacted seriously on his familial and financial circumstances. His case was the only one taken over by IPID but, by then, crucial evidence in the form of CCTV footage had not been retrieved, and had been destroyed. Nor did the investigator take a statement from a witness who had been threatened. There were constant delays in holding identity (ID) parades but eventually alleged perpetrators were identified, and one was charged. When the case finally came to trial two years later witnesses who had identified the policeman were – given the time lapse -unable to confirm that he was the same man they had identified. Nor could they describe exactly what his role had been – which is hardly surprising, since Zulu had been attacked by a group of police, who kicked, and hit with the butt of a gun and open fists by a group of police.. The court accepted that Zulu had been abused but was unable to confirm the identity of the specific police member. Recommendations by IPID about disciplinary action were ignored by the police. Insofar as the other dozens of cases are concerned, police management failed to co-operate in the holding of ID parades so the matters never went to court. No action was taken against them.

Rural areas
The Nombika family, who fled their rural home near Highflats in August 2013 following abuse from community ‘law enforcers’, and threats from the local traditional leader, has not been able to return home. The family has split up with children staying with relatives in order to attend school elsewhere. After intervention by the SAPS Cluster office, Mr Nombika opened a case against those who had assaulted him. However, the case has been withdrawn because some of the witnesses could apparently not be traced. Despite the hardship he and his family continue to suffer, Mr Nombika fears to return home because, before he himself was abused, his son was murdered and the perpetrators have not been brought to book. No action has been taken against the prominent traditional leader who ordered the Nombika family from the area, nor has there been any response from the relevant provincial department to the complaint about the chief. This appears yet another case in which errant leaders are treated with kid gloves by the government. An independent observer at the community meeting called by the SAPS cluster office gained the impression that the police were trying to protect the image of the chief.

In some areas cases of abuse of women and children may be reported to the local traditional leadership, and no further action is necessarily taken. Leaders would benefit from training in referral and follow up of such cases. Some chiefs are alleged perpetrators of such crimes by engaging in the practice of ukuthwala (abduction of young women). Despite the traditional courts bill having been withdrawn by parliament it seems that the government may well bow to pressure and resurrect it after the elections. Traditional leaders should only have ceremonial powers , as is the case in virtually all other African countries. Any moves by the government to give these leaders more powers than they already have would raise questions about its commitment to democracy – as opposed to feudalism. The devolution of political power to chiefs subverts democracy.

How can the majority of South African’s have confidence in the criminal justice system, given such glaring discrimination in the way that investigations and court proceedings are handled?

As the first democratic elections loomed in April 1994 South Africa was on a knife edge, with raging violence threatening a slide into civil war. The source of the tensions lay in the demands of conservative groupings for regional autonomy as opposed to the interim constitution agreed to by the ANC and NP. Amidst threats of election boycott, politically contested townships and black rural areas especially, but not exclusively, in KZN, were wracked by state-sponsored violence. In April 1994 alone, despite a State of Emergency, at least 338 people died in the province. Gradually all the election opponents, agreed to participate, the last being the IFP, which announced its decision days before the elections. There was a collective sigh of relief when the elections proceeded relatively peacefully. However, political killings continued afterwards. Between May and December 1994, there were at least 640 such deaths in KZN. This pattern was to continue for the rest of the decade, with over 4 000 recorded deaths between April 1994 and the end of 1999. While the political death toll, and murders generally, continued to decline in the new millennium, and each subsequent election was more peaceful than the previous one, South Africa has continued to experience exceptionally high levels of violence for the past twenty years.
As well established patterns of political and taxi-related killings continued after the elections the most noticeable impact of violence on the lives of all South Africans was that of a general criminal nature (all violence is, of course, criminal). Townships and other deprived areas country-wide had long been havens for criminals – which had led to the establishment of vigilante groupings in Durban townships in the 1970s. With the eruption of political violence and a massive influx of guns into those areas in the 1980s and 1990s, visible, violent crime also spread rapidly to the ‘whites only’ areas which had, hitherto, been relatively secure. Protest action, which continued after the advent of democracy, has, over the years, become increasingly violent. There is also a history of violence on the mines, including in the Rustenburg area made notorious by the 2012 Marikana massacre. Long standing organized-crime networks continued and expanded, with increasing reports of drugs such as mandrax flooding townships and rural areas
Farm attacks, while not a new phenomenon, carried on, and appeared more conspicuous. Following claims by farmers’ associations that they were politically-motivated, as some had been during the apartheid years, the then Minister of Safety and Security established a research committee to investigate the phenomenon. Its 2003 report, based on exhaustive research, failed to find any evidence of political orchestration. However, in areas farmed by previously disadvantaged small-scale farmers such as Mangete (near Mandeni) and Nqabeni (near Harding), criminal invasions of land, orchestrated by local traditional leaders, took place, and were accompanied by countless criminal acts of violence, including attacks on the farmers themselves and the burning of their property and crops.
That South Africa had exceptionally high levels of violence against women and children, including rape – even of babies – had become apparent by the 1990s. Political violence and the climate of ungovernability in many areas fuelled the rape epidemic, with young ‘soldiers’ demanding sexual favours as their right, and using rape as a weapon against political enemies.
By the late 1990s it was obvious that there were serious problems with the criminal justice system, especially policing. The amalgamation of the different police forces (homelands and the former South African Police) had been fraught with problems and the supposed transformation of the service was handled very badly, with disastrous, long-term consequences. In far too many cases diligence and experience were overlooked and members were promoted to management positions beyond their levels of competence. Many members with long period of unblemished service – especially indigenous African – left the new SAPS, impacting badly on components such as detective services. Appalling police brutality was manifest in continuing abuse, torture, deaths and killings which, if anything, have increased noticeably in the past few years.
It is against this background of unchecked criminal violence that the continuation of political killings, should be seen. Sporadic killings of this nature have continued all over the country, with different dynamics, but KZN has borne the brunt of this type of violence, especially during the first five years of democracy.. During this time tensions between parties continued, especially during the initial years when national and provincial constitutions were being finalized. In 1997 the relationship between the IFP and the ANC started to improve, with continuing peace talks between the leadership of the parties (although there is no evidence that these talks impacted on what was happening in violence-torn communities where the political killing business continued as usual).
It was excellent detective work which rapidly reduced high violence levels in Mandini and Mtubatuba, and the repercussions of the Shobashobane massacre, in December 1995, which had a major impact on the continuing killings in the Izingolweni and KwaXolo (Margate) areas. Following dozens of killings around Mandeni in 1995 a small team of detectives under former Goldstone investigator Mandla Vilakazi soon made arrests which led to High Court convictions The same team arrested the key warlord in Mtubatuba and his hitmen. The warlord was killed while on bail (for the fourth time) and, during the high court trial of his henchmen it was confirmed that they had been assisted in their attacks by members of the Umfolosi based Stability Unit (who were also implicated in cases of serious abuse in many north coast areas). Following the Shobashobane massacre there was a major spotlight on the police (who had failed to protect the targeted community), especially when a Commission of Enquiry held hearings. Several key warlords were killed and the areas stabilized. While the conflict in these areas had been between the IFP and the ANC, events in Richmond in the late 1990s involved ANC supporters and those of the late Sifiso Nkabinde, a former ANC warlord who had moved to the newly formed UDM. While the truth of what really happened in Richmond remains to be told there is enough evidence to show the flames were being fanned by members of the police and intelligence operatives.
Violence linked to politics has continued up to the present, but has decreased. Potential flashpoints include Durban hostels, Estcourt and the Ulundi/Nongoma area. Although an estimated 64 politically-linked killings have taken place in the past four years the decline in the past decade has been noticeable. Defining what constitutes a political killing has become increasingly difficult because of factors such as links between politicians and taxi operators and, in some areas, the alleged involvement of some politicians in drug dealing. Intra-party conflict has become increasingly common, especially as elections approach and there is competition over places on party lists. Politicians exposing corruption in their own parties also risk being killed.
Two factors are integral to the continuing violence in this province – the ready availability of weapons and continued paramilitary training, including in Macambini and Mahlabatini in the 2006-2008 period. Whether these recruits are implicated in political, taxi, or other hits is not known.
South Africa remains an abnormally violent society and, without fundamental structural change, there is little light on the horizon. As long as children grow up as victims of, and witnesses to, abuse, without suitable male role models, and single sex hostels are not replaced by family accommodation, the current cycle of violence is likely to persist. Policing has continued to deteriorate – markedly so in recent years –and brutality and corruption are endemic. If nothing is done, urgently, to remedy policing ills violent crime will continue to pay – and vigilantism will continue to undermine the rule of law.

For as long as there has been taxi violence in the KwaDukuza/Maphumulo/Kranskop region there have been allegations (some from within the police) of collusion between taxi operators and certain police members who are believed to take kick backs from the taxi bosses. Taxi problems are intra- as well as inter-association. In KwaDukuza a number of operators allege that they faced death because they refuse to pay protection money to Stanger Association bosses. One of these was Nkosinathi Xaba who, in March 2010, made a statement to the police about being under threat of death from taxi men operating in collusion with the police. Shortly afterwards he was shot dead by a police member who has never been brought to book. A number of his associates, including Dalisu Sangweni, have been keeping a low profile since then. Sangweni now claims that he is in serious danger of being killed by a Stanger Taxi Association official, M, acting in collusion with the police.

M has apparently opened a case of attempted murder against Sangweni at Kranskop. Sangweni, who claims he has not been in Kranskop for years, firmly believes that he will be arrested and killed by members at that station acting in collusion with M. He says this is the fourth spurious case that M has opened, or been involved in, against him. The first, a case of murder, was thrown out of the high court. The other cases, of attempted murder, were also withdrawn. There were attempts to kill him when he went to court, says Sangweni.

In September 2012 Sangweni was shot and injured near the KwaDukuza taxi rank. Other operators with him narrowly escaped injury. One of them was Nkosinathi Mthethwa, who was shot dead earlier this year. Following the shooting Sangweni’s associates went to report to KwaDukuza station where, they allege, they were followed by the men who shot them, including M. The cases which were opened are under investigation by the Taxi Task Team but there have been no arrests. M is also alleged to be implicated in the recent violence between the Stanger and Dolphin Coast association.

Sangweni is not the first taxi operator to claim that arrests are orchestrated in order to kill them. The station commissioner at Kranskop, the Cluster Commander at Greytown, and Provincial and National SAPS management have been apprised of Sangweni’s fears and asked to ensure that any arrest should only take place in the presence of Sangweni’s lawyer, and provided there is sufficient evidence. If it is necessary to arrest Sangweni they have also been asked to detain him in Durban or Pietermaritzburg.

Sangweni’s fears are yet another indictment of the lack of trust by far too many South Africans in the police – a lack of trust that, for some, is so extreme that one’s life is seen to be in danger. The context in which this case against Sangweni has been opened is one in which the police frequently arrest people without sufficiently good reason. It is also one in which there is evidence of police complicity in taxi violence. When, in 2008, 42 guns which were exhibits in taxi-related cases were stolen from the kwaMaphumulo station a senior police source confirmed that it must have been an ‘inside job’